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INTRODUCTION 
y all outward appearances, times have never been better for non-
profit organizations, especially for international and foreign-based 
entities operating around the globe, frequently referred to as nongovern-
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mental organizations (“NGOs”). In recent decades the number, size, and 
impact of international NGOs have expanded greatly.1 Private voluntary 
entities regularly work collaboratively with individuals, key government 
policymakers, multinational corporations, and major intergovernmental 
institutions on issues of importance to the organization, including emer-
gency humanitarian relief, conflict resolution, economic and social de-
velopment, environmental protection and sustainability, political con-
sciousness-raising about human and civil rights, and monitoring national 
and transnational actors.2 Although NGOs do not have the law-making 
authority of the state, their ability to generate what scholars call “soft” 
law, through campaigning, mobilization, advocacy, lobbying, agenda-
setting, and negotiation, is widely acknowledged and put to effective 
use.3 In some instances, certain societal challenges are left almost entire-
ly to the charitable sector to resolve because neither governments nor 
private businesses are able or willing to act.4 As a result, NGOs have be-
come a powerful force in global governance.5 According to President Bill 
Clinton: 
The impact of . . . three trends—the growth of civil society in the de-
veloping world, the vast pool of new wealth available for giving, and 
the rising influence of small donors—has been reinforced by the proven 
ability of NGOs of all sizes and missions to have a positive effect on 
problems at home and abroad, often in partnership with governments 
and local NGOs in developing countries.6 
                                                                                                             
 1. ETHICAL QUESTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL NGOS: AN EXCHANGE BETWEEN 
PHILOSOPHERS AND NGOS 1 (Keith Horton & Chris Roche eds., 2010). 
 2. See Shamima Ahmed, The Impact of NGOs on International Organizations: 
Complexities and Considerations, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 817, 817 (2011). 
 3. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Commentary: Privately Generated Soft Law in Interna-
tional Governance, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 166, 166–69 
(Thomas J. Biersteker et al. eds., 2007); Dana Brakman Reiser & Claire R. Kelly, Linking 
NGO Accountability and the Legitimacy of Global Governance, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 
1011, 1013 (2011); see generally Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft 
Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 
MINN. L. REV. 706, 795–96 (2010). 
 4. Cf. Richard Steinberg, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organizations, in THE 
NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, 117, 119–25 (Walter W. Powell & Rich-
ard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006) (summarizing economics literature explaining nonprofits 
as a response to market and government failures); Garry W. Jenkins, Incorporation 
Choice, Uniformity, and the Reform of Nonprofit State Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1113, 1121 
(2007) (“Nonprofit organizations occupy a critical space between society’s private and 
public spheres.”). 
 5. See Alyssa A. Dirusso, American Nonprofit Law In Comparative Perspective, 10 
WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 39, 40 (2011). 
 6. BILL CLINTON, GIVING: HOW EACH OF US CAN CHANGE THE WORLD 11 (2007). 
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Yet critical voices from both the left and the right, private organization 
“watch” projects, and governments are actively seeking to curb the grow-
ing power of nonprofit organizations.7 International nonprofits, often 
criticized for a lack of accountability and legitimacy, are increasingly 
under attack.8 
This Article examines the rise of the growing anti-NGO movement. 
Still modest in size and scope, this movement receives little systematic 
study and academic attention. This Article thus takes a closer look at the 
nature and validity of the critiques directed at NGOs. In doing so, it con-
siders the emergent dynamics between two different types of nonprofit 
organizations: larger donor organizations primarily located in the Global 
North (i.e., industrialized countries, primarily in Europe and North 
America) and smaller, grant-receiving “Southern NGOs,” a term used for 
organizations operating in less-developed countries (whether in the 
southern hemisphere or not) that usually work on international develop-
ment issues. Although some of the critiques around NGO representative-
ness and voice may have poignancy, the typically proposed solution—
greater accountability—actually exacerbates the problem. Ironically, as 
Northern funders attempt to exert control over grantmaking activities to 
enhance their own accountability, they may also unwittingly weaken the 
accountability and legitimacy claims of the NGOs they fund. Further-
more, this destructive cycle dilutes the transformative potential of local-
ized civic action and civil society. 
Sometimes referred to as the “independent sector,” “nonprofit sector,” 
“charitable sector,” or “third sector,” nonprofit entities are, in many 
ways, hybrids of their public- and private-sector counterparts. In some 
respects nonprofits resemble for-profit corporate entities to the extent 
that nonprofits are “private, independent, autonomous enterprises,”9 but 
also resemble public sector organizations in their commitment and dedi-
cation (in both a moral and legal sense) to advancing the public good (as 
the supporters may define it). 
One critical difference, however, is that nonprofit organizations exist 
without clear lines of accountability. Corporate and government power 
each have clear and formal measures of accountability. Corporate power 
is constrained by shareholders who own equity in the companies. Gov-
                                                                                                             
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See, e.g., Mari Fitzduff & Cheyanne Church, Stepping Up to the Table: NGO 
Strategies for Influencing Policy on Conflict Issues, in NGOS AT THE TABLE 1, 10–12 
(Mari Fitzduff & Cheyanne Church eds., 2004). 
 9. Evelyn Brody & John Tyler, Respecting Foundation and Charity Autonomy: How 
Public Is Private Philanthropy?, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 573 (2010). 
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ernment power, at least in the case of democratically controlled govern-
ments, is held to account through voting of the collective citizenry. The 
nonprofit sector, however, lacks equivalent accountability mechanisms.10 
This absence of formal accountability contributes to anxiety about or 
mistrust of the third sector, especially when its activities begin to cross 
national borders. 
Much has been written examining the rise, risks, claims, and lessons of 
the anti-globalization11 and anti-corporate movements.12 Yet less promi-
nent is the parallel criticism about societal threats stemming from the 
role and influence of humanitarian and international NGOs. The exist-
ence of such critics may be especially surprising because Northern NGOs 
have gained significant recognition for their effective work,13 are 
                                                                                                             
 10. See PETER FRUMKIN, ON BEING NONPROFIT 5–6 (2002); Evelyn Brody, Agents 
Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organi-
zational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 489 (1996); Thomas L. Greaney & Kathleen 
M. Boozang, Mission, Margin, and Trust in the Nonprofit Health Care Enterprise, 5 
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 82–85 (2005); see also Dana Brakman Reiser, 
Director Independence in the Independent Sector, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 795, 813 (2007) 
[hereinafter, Brakman Reiser, Director Independence] (noting that the nonprofit context 
lacks “clear lines of accountability”). 
 11. See, e.g., DAVID HELD & ANTHONY MCGREW, GLOBALIZATION/ANTI-
GLOBALIZATION: BEYOND THE GREAT DIVIDE (2d ed. 2007); Evan E. Hillebrand, Deglob-
alization Scenarios: Who Wins? Who Loses?, 10 GLOBAL ECON. J. 1, 5 (2010) (describing 
anti-globalization efforts and suggesting such efforts are the product of nations and pow-
erful economic groups seeking to protect domestic interests); Erika George, See No Evil? 
Revisiting Early Visions of the Social Responsibility of Business: Adolf A. Berle’s Contri-
bution to Contemporary Conversations, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 965, 979 (2010) (suggest-
ing corporations must become champions of societal good in response to the growing 
anti-globalization movement against corporate expansion). 
 12. See, e.g., EVAN OSBORNE, THE RISE OF THE ANTI-CORPORATE MOVEMENT (2007); 
Kevin T. Jackson, Global Corporate Governance: Soft Law and Reputational Accounta-
bility, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 41, 86 (2010); see also Dale Rubin, Corporate Personhood: 
How the Courts Have Employed Bogus Jurisprudence to Grant Corporations Constitu-
tional Rights Intended for Individuals, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 523, 525–34 (2010) (trac-
ing the history of anti-corporate sentiment in colonial America and Europe). 
 13. See, e.g., Lisa Schenck, Climate Change “Crisis”–Struggling for Worldwide 
Collective Action, 19 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 319, 355 (2008) (discussing 
NGO contributions in the area of international environmental law); Charles Trueheart, 
Medical Aid Group Wins Nobel Prize; Doctors Without Borders Treats Victims, Pushes 
Peace, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1999, at A1 (noting that the international relief agency 
which is officially known by its French name, Médecins Sans Frontières, won the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 1999); Felice D. Gaer, Foreword to SUBCONTRACTING PEACE: THE 
CHALLENGES OF NGO PEACEBUILDING, at xv (Oliver P. Richmond & Henry F. Carey eds., 
2005) (“Non-governmental organizations and other local actors have conducted some of 
their most valuable and effective work over the years in the area of peacebuilding . . . 
This was not always the case.”). 
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acknowledged as important contributors to civil society,14 have expanded 
their global reach, and have become more widely known among the gen-
eral public.15 Indeed, public opinion data show that NGOs are widely 
respected and trusted. In an annual worldwide survey of opinion shapers, 
NGOs are regularly found to command the highest levels of trust among 
major institutions.16 
Despite, or perhaps because of, the new visibility of NGOs, they also 
have been the subject of intense criticism. The rise in anti-NGO rhetoric 
and activity would be of little interest if it represented a fringe view. 
However, the critics are also found in the mainstream: public officials 
have expressed concerns about NGO influence,17 development scholars 
have questioned the value of foreign aid and the value of the work con-
ducted by nonprofit organizations,18 and influential journalists also raised 
                                                                                                             
 14. See Nina J. Crimm, The Moral Hazard of Anti-Terrorism Financing Measures: A 
Potential To Compromise Civil Societies and National Interests, 43 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 577, 579 (2008); Miriam Galston, Civic Renewal and the Regulation of Nonprofits, 
13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 289, 291 (2004); Garry W. Jenkins, Soft Power, Strategic 
Security, and International Philanthropy, 85 N.C. L. REV. 773, 789 (2007) [hereinafter 
Jenkins, Soft Power]. 
 15. See James McGann & Mary Johnstone, The Power Shift and the NGO Credibility 
Crisis, 11 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 159, 160; Jim Bencivenga, Critical Mass, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 3, 2000, at 15. 
 16. See Latraviette Smith, 2011 Edelman Trust Barometer Findings, EDELMAN 11 
(2011), 
http://www.edelman.com/trust/2011/uploads/Edelman%20Trust%20Barometer%20Globa
l%20Deck.pdf [hereinafter EDELMAN] (noting that, in the firm’s annual survey gauging 
attitudes about the state of trust, NGOs are the most trusted institution in comparison to 
business, government, and media across twenty-three countries from 2008–2011). 
 17. See, e.g., Elaine L. Chao, U.S. Sec’y of Labor, Address at the Federalist Society’s 
National Lawyers Convention Sessions (Nov. 14, 2003), available at http://www.fed-
soc.org/doclib/20070924_Chao2003NLC.pdf (“[S]pecial interest agendas [of NGOs] tend 
to reflect a narrow rather than a broad spectrum of public opinion” and “transparency and 
accountability are more important than ever before in international organizations”); see 
also Steve Charnovitz, Accountability of Non-Governmental Organizations in Global 
Governance, in NGO ACCOUNTABILITY: POLITICS, PRINCIPLES, & INNOVATIONS 21, 24–25 
(Lisa Jordan & Peter Van Tuijl eds., 2006) (discussing John Bolton’s statements—made 
while serving as Senior Vice President for the American Enterprise Institute—that claim 
NGOs “see [themselves] as beyond national politics . . . [which has] profoundly anti-
democratic implications” and compare the NGO system to fascism by suggesting “Mus-
solini would smile on the Forum of Civil Society.”). 
 18. See generally WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN: WHY THE WEST’S 
EFFORTS TO AID THE REST HAVE DONE SO MUCH ILL AND SO LITTLE GOOD (2006) (criti-
cizing Western aid to the developing world as ineffective at best and harmful at worst); 
Amy J. Cohen, Thinking With Culture in Law and Development, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 511, 
571 (2009); Paul Wapner, Democracy and Social Movements, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
PROC. 305, 306 (2003) (discussing criticism of NGOs by scholars). 
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alarms about NGOs and their work.19 Further, some evidence suggests 
that despite the goodwill toward NGOs,20 support may be softening.21 
The anti-NGO movement is emerging as a force with which to be 
reckoned. What does this movement mean for those concerned about 
civil society and for those who value the unique contributions of the 
nonprofit sector? To begin to answer this question, it is important to un-
derstand the various arguments against nonprofit organizations and the 
creation of pockets of resistance to nonprofit organizations and where 
they might lead. By beginning to fill in the gap in literature about the 
growing opposition to nonprofit organizations and their role in global 
governance, this Article hopes to shed light on debates about nonprofit 
accountability and legitimacy. Another aim of this Article is to mine the 
critiques for insights and to suggest ways government policy makers and 
foundation trustees and managers can establish regulations and imple-
ment international philanthropy in ways that support NGOs without em-
boldening their critics. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the history and 
background of NGOs, discussing what a nongovernmental organization 
is and why it is being criticized. It also addresses the concept of account-
ability as applied to NGOs and attempts to unravel the term’s many dif-
ferent meanings and strands. Part II describes the wide range of anti-
NGO activities and voices and the typical claims leveled against such 
organizations. This part examines organized public relations campaigns 
led by the political right, academic dissent on the left, and anti-NGO 
lawmaking and political activity by governments on several continents 
that have sought to limit NGO involvement in policy matters. In sifting 
through the various arguments and critiques of NGOs, a troubling con-
cern emerges: how to ensure that NGOs formed to reflect the participa-
tion, authenticity, and voice of a wide range of interested peoples actual-
ly do so, rather than becoming beholden to global elites or outside ex-
perts. Part III discusses the implications for the future. In particular, the 
                                                                                                             
 19. See, e.g., William Booth, International Charities Fall Short in Haiti, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 2, 2011, at A6 (suggesting that NGOs have become “hobbled by poor coordination, 
high turnover and a lack of transparency” and “[c]harity groups have been working in 
Haiti for decades . . . but the country is worse off economically than it was during the 
dark days of dictator[ship].”); Editorial, Holding Civic Groups Accountable, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 21, 2003, at A18 (“[NGOs] owe it to the public to be accountable and transparent 
themselves.”); Mary Beth Sheridan, In Aid for Plan for Haiti, U.S. to Rebuild from Gov-
ernment Outward; New Approach Relies more on Statecraft, Less on Web of NGOs, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2010, at A8 (claiming the dependence of Haiti on NGO-provided 
aid has led to an “atrophied central government”). 
 20. Cf. EDELMAN, supra note 16, at 11 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra text accompanying notes 94–99. 
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insights gained from a deeper understanding of the anti-NGO fears and 
criticisms suggest that law, public policy, and governance pressures 
might presently be working to exacerbate, rather than to alleviate, some 
of the concerns. 
Although I question much of the criticism, disagree with the conclu-
sions, and reject the policy prescriptions of the anti-NGO movement, I 
appreciate the effort to expose conflicts that arise when philanthropy be-
comes more about serving funders and less about encouraging self-
development. One clear message emerges from this critical examination: 
it is a mistake to ignore the anti-NGO critics and their arguments. For 
supporters of NGOs, the weight of the anti-NGO discourse and lawmak-
ing will neither discredit international nonprofit activity nor lead partici-
pants to disengage. Rather, it may lead to productive reform. For exam-
ple some large funders and operating charities may reconsider how their 
own behavior—especially their aggressive control over programming 
and policies—may threaten the independence of smaller nonprofits and 
citizens’ groups. Ironically, much of the anti-NGO discourse may end up 
serving to remind Northern NGOs that if their support is to have a trans-
formative impact, they must empower those closest to the problems. 
Moreover, reconsideration of grantmaking practices and behaviors that 
reinforce the dominance of Northern funders over the subservience of 
Southern NGOs may take on a new sense of urgency in light of a loom-
ing anti-NGO threat. 
I. UNDERSTANDING NGOS 
Over the past decade and a half, NGOs have risen in the public con-
sciousness, and are now a part of everyday conversation. Today an ideal-
istic young person who seeks to change the world often wants to work 
for an NGO. Despite such visibility and ubiquity, the term “nongovern-
mental organization” is still confusing to some, lacking a consistent and 
settled definition.22 
Nonprofit organizations are critically important contributors to civil 
society.23 NGOs generally represent people apart from, and sometimes 
against, the state. In addition to the traditional roles associated with 
                                                                                                             
 22. See SHAMIMA AHMED & DAVID M. POTTER, NGOS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 8–
9 (2006). 
 23. See Barbara K. Bucholtz, Reflections on the Role of Nonprofit Associations in a 
Representative Democracy, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 555, 571–78 (1998); Laksh-
man Guruswamy, State Responsibility in Promoting Environmental Corporate Accounta-
bility, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 209, 231 (2010); Jenkins, Soft Power, supra note 14, 
at 789; Dana Brakman Reiser, Dismembering Civil Society: The Social Cost of Internally 
Undemocratic Nonprofits, 82 OR. L. REV. 829, 830–31, 867–74 (2003). 
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cross-border and locally-based organizations in the developing world 
such as basic disaster relief, the work of the modern NGO also may in-
clude economic and social development,24 political advocacy,25 public 
education and awareness,26 agenda setting,27 political representation and 
enforcement,28 and corporate monitoring and reporting,29 among other 
activities. In contrast to corporations that represent business interests, 
NGOs have been described as “people’s organizations.”30 
Although there may be a tendency to think of NGOs as a monolithic 
collective, individual organizations vary considerably. The interests of 
NGOs vary widely. For instance, NGOs may provide direct basic ser-
vices, organize communities to formulate solutions to problems, or advo-
cate the implementation of particular policies.31 They focus on a wide 
range of activities and differ in their organizational structures and 
sources of support. Most NGOs receive funding from one or more 
sources, including donations, grants, contracts, fees for services, product 
sales, and membership dues.32 They may be centrally organized or loose-
                                                                                                             
 24. See HELMUT K. ANHEIER & LESTER M. SALAMON, THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN THE 
DEVELOPING WORLD 2 (1998); Jenkins, Soft Power, supra note 14, at 790. 
 25. See MARC LINDENBERG & CORALIE BRYANT, GOING GLOBAL: TRANSFORMING 
RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT NGOS 173–206 (2001). 
 26. See David Moore, Safeguarding Civil Society in Politically Complex Environ-
ments, INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., June 2007, at 3, 7–11. 
 27. See Masudul K. Biswas, Developmental Issues in News Media: NGO-Media In-
teraction in Bangladesh, INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., June 2007, at 77, 85–86; Dinah 
Shelton, International Human Rights Law: Principled, Double, or Absent Standards?, 25 
LAW & INEQ. 467, 482–83 (2007). 
 28. See, e.g., Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, NGO Standing and Influence in Regional Human 
Rights Courts and Commissions, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 911 (2011) (analyzing NGOs’ 
human rights enforcement activities via the European Court of Human Rights, Inter-
American Human Rights Commission, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights). 
 29. See Gerald Keim, Nongovernmental Organizations and Business-Government 
Relations: The Importance of Institutions, in GLOBALIZATION AND NGOS 19, 19 (Jonathan 
P. Doh & Hildy Teegen eds., 2003). 
 30. See MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE 312 (2000) (citation omitted); 
Robert Charles Blitt, Who Will Watch the Watchdogs? Human Rights Nongovernmental 
Organizations and the Case For Regulation, 10 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 280 n.80 
(2004) [hereinafter Blitt, Who Will Watch the Watchdogs?] (discussing the use of the 
term the term “international people’s organizations”). 
 31. See Sarah Ben Néfissa, Introduction: NGOs and Governance in the Arab World: 
A Question of Democracy to NGOS AND GOVERNANCE IN THE ARAB WORLD 1, 31 (Sarah 
Ben Néfissa et al. eds., 2005). 
 32. See Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle, Scope and Dimensions of the Non-
profit Sector, in THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 66, 
74–75 (describing common revenue sources in the nonprofit sector). 
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ly affiliated through federation structures. In general, this large and di-
verse universe of organizations operates at local, national, and interna-
tional levels. 
A. Overview and Terminology 
Nongovernmental organizations have existed for centuries and have 
held a celebrated place in history,33 but the term NGO is relatively 
young. Many academics trace the origin of the term “nongovernmental 
organization” to shortly after World War II.34 Most significantly, the 
United Nations adopted the term in 1945 when it referred to “non-
governmental organizations” in its Charter35 to describe “a vast range of 
international and national citizens organizations, trade unions, voluntary 
associations, research institutes, public policy centers, private govern-
ment agencies, business and trade associations, foundations and charita-
ble endeavors.”36 Specifically, the Charter delegated the responsibility 
for making “suitable arrangements for consultation with non-
governmental organizations” to the U.N. Economic and Social Council.37 
Today, “NGO” continues to be an expansive term that refers to a for-
mal organization that is neither a government nor a corporate institution, 
but rather a voluntary association within civil society.38 As Professor 
Thomas Kelley observed, “Global North actors consider NGOs as either 
                                                                                                             
 33. See, e.g., 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 489, 492 (Harvey 
C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1840). 
 34. See, e.g., Kerstin Martens, Mission Impossible? Defining Nongovernmental Or-
ganizations, 13 VOLUNTAS: INT’L J. VOLUNTARY & NONPROFIT ORG. 271, 271 (2002). But 
see Charnovitz, supra note 17, at 22 (suggesting the term was used as early as 1920, after 
the negotiation of international labor treaties, to describe the groups that were excluded 
from negotiations). 
 35. See Martens, supra note 34, at 271; U.N. Charter art. 71; SERGEY RIPINSKY & 
PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, NGO INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 5 (2007) (recognizing that the United Nations introduced the term 
“non-governmental organization” in its Charter). 
 36. Angus Archer, Methods of Multilateral Management: The Interrelationships of 
International Organizations and NGOs, in THE US, THE UN, AND THE MANAGEMENT OF 
GLOBAL CHANGE 303, 303 (Toby Trister Gati ed., 1983). 
 37. U.N. Charter art. 71. It is important to note that entities similar to NGOs—such as 
associations of individuals that fought for the abolition of slavery in the United States—
existed before this formal recognition, but were not labeled as “NGOs.” 
 38. See generally ANN C. HUDOCK, NGOS AND CIVIL SOCIETY 1 (1999) (“[NGOs are] 
those organizations outside the realm of government, and distinct from the business 
community.”); Martens, supra note 34 (analyzing the term “NGO” from a legal and soci-
ological perspective in an attempt to arrive at a holistic definition). 
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essential to or the alter ego of civil society.”39 Of course, as Professor 
Kelley accurately notes, civil society is a “flexible” and “malleable” con-
cept.40 From my perspective, civil society represents a capacious frame-
work of civic values encompassing the space, the set of institutions, the 
organizations, the networks, and the behaviors situated between the state, 
the business world, and the family. Civil society facilitates exchanges 
among citizens, enables communication channels between citizens and 
the state, promotes civic action, and advances common interests based on 
civility. 
As a subset of civil society organizations,41 NGOs are private and vol-
untary, practicing self-governance, and are organized around a common 
mission. Characterized by their voluntary status, NGOs may function on 
a small scale, with a primary focus on domestic concerns or on a global 
scale with transnational operations. 
In the United States, although the terms “nonprofit organization” and 
“nongovernmental organization” are virtually synonymous, the term 
“nonprofit” is usually used to indicate a domestic organization. By con-
trast, the term NGO is used to refer to organizations in either the Global 
North or South that work in less-developed, aid-receiving countries. In 
contrast, the term “nonprofit” is usually used for domestic entities. For 
example, the League of Women Voters or Harvard University are pre-
dominantly thought of as nonprofits, whereas Human Rights Watch or 
BRAC42 would receive the moniker NGO. Additionally, organizations 
such as Amnesty International, CARE USA, Oxfam, and Doctors With-
out Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (hereinafter “MSF”) have made 
NGO a household word. But the many small, community-based or local 
organizations operating in the developing world are also referred to and 
conceived as NGOs. Entities with multinational operations are some-
times referred to as “international nongovernmental organizations” 
(“INGOs”). 
                                                                                                             
 39. Thomas Kelley, Wait! That’s Not What We Meant By Civil Society!: Questioning 
the NGO Orthodoxy in West Africa, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 993, 999 (2011). 
 40. Id. at 997. 
 41. NGOs represent one type of “civil society organization;” other types may include 
informal social groups, sports clubs, labor unions, cultural associations, faith-based or-
ganizations, and professional associations. See THOMAS CAROTHERS, ASSESSING 
DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE: THE CASE OF ROMANIA 64–65 (1996) [hereinafter CAROTHERS, 
ASSESSING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE]. 
 42. “BRAC” is a well-respected development NGO that was originally founded as the 
Bangladesh Rehabilitation Assistance Committee then renamed the Bangladesh Rural 
Advancement Committee and is now simply called BRAC. See A. Mushtaque R. Chow-
dhury & Abbas Bhuiya, The Wider Impacts of BRAC Poverty Alleviation Programme in 
Bangladesh, 16 J. INT’L DEV. 369, 371 (2004). 
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Globalization enables locally based, grass roots organizations to extend 
their reach into national and international domains. One academic thus 
recently defined NGO to include “[any] non-profit, voluntary citizens’ 
group which is organized at a local, national, or international level, and is 
locally, nationally, or internationally active.”43 Another suggested that 
the term encompasses all “formal . . . independent societal organizations 
whose primary aim is to promote common goals at the national or inter-
national level.”44 Interestingly, however, NGOs do not have any uni-
formly recognized international legal personality; they are governed only 
by relevant national regulation where they are located. 
B. Origins and Growth 
The roots and foundational practices of NGOs can be traced back cen-
turies. For example, multiple societies (as they were then called) were 
established in the United States, England, and France to advocate for the 
abolition of slavery and the international slave trade in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.45 Organizations such as the Society for the Relief of 
Free Negroes Unlawfully Held in Bondage (founded in the United States 
in 1775),46 the Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the Abolition of 
Slavery (founded in 1787), the Society for Effecting the Abolition of 
Slave Trade (founded in England in 1787), and the Societé des Amis des 
Noirs (founded in France in 1788)47 exchanged information, coordinated 
efforts (sending freed slaves on speaking tours), and employed shared 
tactics.48 Collectively, this group of organizations might aptly be consid-
ered the world’s “first transnational advocacy network.” Beginning in 
1815, a range and number of peace societies (another early incarnation of 
globalized NGOs) emerged in the United States and Europe, and grew to 
                                                                                                             
 43. Anton Vedder, Questioning the Legitimacy of Non-Governmental Organizations, 
in NGO INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND POLICY 1, 2 (Anton Vedder 
ed., 2007). 
 44. Martens, supra note 34, at 282. 
 45. See MARGARET P. KARNS & KAREN A. MINGST, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: 
THE POLITICS AND PROCESSES OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 224 (2004); Steve Charnovitz, 
Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT’L 
L. 183, 191–92 (1997) [hereinafter Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation]. 
 46. See George E. Edwards, Assessing the Effectiveness of Human Rights Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) From the Birth of the United Nations to the 21st 
Century: Ten Attributes of Highly Successful Human Rights NGOs, 19 MICH. ST. J. INT’L 
L. 165, 170 n.10 (2010). 
 47. See KARNS & MINGST, supra note 45, at 420; Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Par-
ticipation, supra note 45, at 192. 
 48. See KARNS & MINGST, supra note 45, at 428. 
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more than 400 in number by the turn of the century.49 These “peace soci-
eties had a significant influence on international organization and law,”50 
most notably, in connection with the development of international arbi-
tration and mediation. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, NGOs continued to make a 
mark on world affairs, but during the 1930s and 1940s, NGO influence 
seemed to wane. In describing NGO influence during the first half of the 
twentieth century, political scientists Margaret Karns and Karen Mingst 
note that: 
In the twentieth century, peace groups . . . developed the ideas that 
shaped the League of Nations and later the United Nations . . . . The 
League of Nations also invited NGOs to participate in meetings [and 
conferences] . . . . Many NGOs established offices in Geneva to facili-
tate contacts with the league . . . . Between 1930 and 1945, NGOs’ in-
fluence diminished, in large part because governments were preoccu-
pied with rising security threats and economic crisis and the league’s 
role declined.51 
Several of today’s most prominent Northern NGOs were founded in 
the twentieth century. In the aftermath of World War I and the Russian 
Revolution, Save the Children was founded in the United Kingdom in 
1919.52 It addressed the needs of orphaned children in Austria and East-
ern Europe after the war, and it quickly became an advocate for the rights 
of children worldwide.53 Although Oxfam International, an organization 
focused on global poverty relief, was technically formed in 1995 
(through a combination of independent groups), its origins date back to 
Britain in 1942 and the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, founded to 
relieve famine in Nazi-occupied Greece.54 Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch, two renowned human rights-focused NGOs, were 
born in the 1960s and 1970s, respectively.55 MSF, the international med-
ical humanitarian organization, was formally established in France in 
1971, then joined by sister organizations in Belgium, Switzerland, and 
the Netherlands in the early 1980s, later expanding throughout Europe, 
                                                                                                             
 49. See Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation, supra note 45, at 192–93. 
 50. Id. at 193. 
 51. KARNS & MINGST, supra note 45, at 225. 
 52. See LINDENBERG & BRYANT, supra note 25, at 13. 
 53. See id.; History, SAVE THE CHILDREN, http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/about-
us/history#begining (last visited Feb. 3, 2012). 
 54. See LINDENBERG & BRYANT, supra note 25, at 13–15. 
 55. See Naz K. Modirzadeh, Taking Islamic Law Seriously: INGOs and the Battle for 
Muslim Hearts and Minds, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 191, 197 n.16 (2006). 
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North America, Australia, and Hong Kong.56 Originally, MSF started as 
a response to the Nigerian-Biafra War and the unwillingness of other 
humanitarian services to intervene without government approval; today it 
continues to provide emergency medical assistance to human populations 
in danger.57 
Over the past two decades, the number of NGOs operating globally has 
grown dramatically.58 From established Northern NGOs based in the de-
veloped countries of Europe, North America, and parts of Asia to South-
ern NGOs operating in the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Lat-
in America, both the numerical growth and the increase in institutional 
influence of NGOs are profound. For example, “in the United States 
alone the number of internationally active NGOs formally registered 
with U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and their rev-
enues grew much faster than both U.S. total giving to charities and the 
U.S. gross domestic product (GDP).”59 Similar trends also are reflected 
at the local level with many developing countries witnessing significant 
increases in the number of NGOs operating on the ground.60 
                                                                                                             
 56. See About Us—Timeline, MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES/DOCTORS WITHOUT 
BORDERS, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/aboutus/timeline.cfm (last visited Feb. 
3, 2012). 
 57. See LINDENBERG & BRYANT, supra note 25, at 14. 
 58. See, e.g., id. at 3. 
 59. Id. at 3. 
 60. See, e.g., Jillian S. Ashley & Pengyu He, Opening One Eye and Closing the Oth-
er: The Legal and Regulatory Environment For “Grassroots” NGOs in China Today, 26 
B.U. INT’L L.J. 29, 38–42 (2008) (discussing growth in China); Blitt, Who Will Watch the 
Watchdogs?, supra note 30, at 294 (discussing growth in India, Brazil, Nepal, and Tuni-
sia); Janice H. Lam, Note, The Rise of the NGO in Bangladesh: Lessons on Improving 
Access to Justice for Women and Religious Minorities, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 101, 
104 (2006) (discussing growth in Bangladesh). 
472 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 37:2 
FIGURE 1. Total Number of U.N. Recognized NGOs by Year, 1946-
2009 
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Although estimates of the total number of NGOs active around the 
world vary widely, the number of NGOs recognized by the United Na-
tions rose sharply over the past six decades. FIGURE 1 displays the in-
crease in total number of NGOs recognized by the United Nations with 
consultative status at the Economic and Social Council (“ECOSOC”).61 
From 1946 through the early 1970s, fewer than two hundred organiza-
tions had consultative status compared to more than 2,700 organizations 
with such status today. The first major growth phase occurred from 1970 
to 1993. FIGURE 2 shows the number of newly recognized NGOs granted 
consultative status in four-year periods from 1946 to 2009. The number 
of new entrants saw a modest but consistent uptick from the early 1970s 
through the mid-1990s.62 
FIGURE 1 shows a second inflection point beginning in the 1990s when 
the total number of U.N.-recognized NGOs began a second dramatic rise. 
                                                                                                             
 61. Consultative status permits organizations to “propose agenda items, send observ-
ers to all meetings, and submit brief written statements.” Ahmed, supra note 2, at 824. It 
also offers certain security clearances providing access to buildings and spaces used by 
diplomats. Id. In addition, NGO engagement with the UN has included involvement with 
the General Assembly, the Security Council, the UN Secretariat, and other agencies. See 
Chadwick F. Alger, Expanding Involvement of NGOs in Emerging Global Governance, 
in SUBCONTRACTING PEACE: THE CHALLENGES OF NGO PEACEBUILDING, supra note 13, at 
3, 6–8; Ahmed, supra note 2, at 826. 
 62. Cf. LIDENBERG & BRYANT, supra note 25, at 3 (“The international nonprofit sec-
tor’s growth took off in the 1970s and accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s.”). 
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In 1994, about five hundred NGOs had participatory rights at ECOSOC; 
by 1998, nearly one thousand organizations enjoyed consultative status. 
Hence the total number of U.N.-recognized organizations increased by 
more than 100% in just four years. In other words, in the span of four 
years, the U.N. recognized as many organizations as it had during its en-
tire fifty year history. By 2009, the number mushroomed to about 2,750. 
FIGURE 2 displays a sharp jump in the number of newly recognized 
NGOs from 1994 to 1997 that reached new levels sustained for each 
four-year period thereafter. 
FIGURE 2. Number of New NGOs Granted Consultative Status by U.N. 
by Year, 1946-2009 
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A series of major global conferences and summits held through the 
early 1990s played a significant role in driving the expansion of U.N.-
NGO relationships.63 The Earth Summit (formally known as United Na-
tions Conference on Environment and Development) in Rio de Janeiro 
(1992) was followed by the World Conference on Human Rights in Vi-
enna (1993), the International Conference on Population and Develop-
ment in Cairo (1994), the World Summit for Social Development in Co-
penhagen (1995), and the Beijing Conference on Women (1995).64 As 
                                                                                                             
 63. See Kim D. Reimann, A View from the Top: International Politics, Norms and the 
Worldwide Growth of NGOs, 50 INT’L STUD. Q. 45, 58 (2006). 
 64. See Major Conferences and Summits, DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFF., 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/about/conferences.shtml (last visited Feb. 3, 
2012); Peter Willets, From “Consultative Arrangements” to “Partnership”: The Chang-
ing Status of NGOs in Diplomacy at the UN, 6 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 191, 195 tbl.1 
(2000). 
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U.N. conferences increasingly became open to a larger number of NGOs, 
their meaningful participation created incentives for more NGO partici-
pation (and specific interest in some form of U.N. recognition),65 espe-
cially among national and local organizations that were previously ex-
cluded.66 
Looking beyond the growth in number of NGOs with U.N. consulta-
tive status, the proliferation of nonprofit organizations is widespread and 
well-documented in many countries. In his book on civil society, Don 
Eberly summarizes the global nature of this phenomenon: 
[Nonprofit scholars Lester Salamon and Helmut Anheier] have found 
that civil society has become a major force in many countries over the 
past decade, its presence “far more widespread than typically thought.” 
In one recent year, 60,000 nonprofits were created. In Germany, the 
number of associations tripled over ten years. Sweden, known for its 
extensive welfare state, showed some of the highest participation rates 
in civil society . . . . One of the largest surveys of the nonprofit sector 
ever conducted, covering twenty-two countries, found over one million 
such organizations operating in India, 210,000 in Brazil, 17,500 in 
Egypt, and 15,000 in Thailand. One in twelve jobs in the countries sur-
veyed were supplied by nonprofits.67 
Accurate estimates of NGOs on a global scale are notoriously difficult 
to tally. But, the NGO origins run deep and their numbers are growing. 
Today, there are few places in the world where NGOs do not operate. 
C. Explaining the NGO Explosion 
A variety of different forces contributed to the increase in the number 
of NGOs operating around the world over the past decades. First, a series 
of significant cultural and political policy shifts occurred during this pe-
riod altering the background conditions affecting the NGO landscape. 
Second, a series of specific societal developments also stand out: the 
                                                                                                             
 65. Organizations may qualify for general consultative status, special consultative 
status, or roster status. Each category has a slightly different set of criteria and accompa-
nying rights. The great majority of NGOs recognized by the U.N. have special consulta-
tive status. See U.N. Secretary-General, List of Non-Governmental Organizations in Con-
sultative Status with the Economic and Social Council as of 1 September 2010: Note by 
the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. E/2010/INF/4 (Sept. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Note of the 
U.N. Secretary-General], available at 
http://esango.un.org/paperless/reports/E2010INF4.pdf. 
 66. See KARNS & MINGST, supra note 45, at 227; Peter J. Spiro, New Players on the 
International Stage, 2 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 19, 26 (1997); Willets, supra note 64, 
at 193–96. 
 67. DON EBERLY, THE RISE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY: BUILDING COMMUNITIES AND 
NATIONS FROM THE BOTTOM UP 18 (2008). 
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growth of private philanthropy and wealth, globalization, and the explo-
sion of communications technologies. 
The first of these relevant policy shifts came during the 1980s as de-
mocracy promotion became a priority of the Reagan administration.68 An 
increased emphasis on foreign aid as a means to promote democracy 
abroad included support for NGOs as part of its core strategy. A new 
wave of democracy aid programs was created as part of the response to 
the heightened anticommunism sentiment of the time.69 For example, 
U.S. Agency for International Development (“USAID”) officials recast 
human rights assistance projects from the 1970s as democracy projects to 
continue and expand their efforts.70 Although initially concentrated on 
Latin America and Asia,71 democracy aid expanded through the early and 
mid-1990s into the former Soviet Union and neighboring Eastern Eu-
rope, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East.72 A key element of the 
democracy aid initiative included the delivery of money and training to 
support locally-based NGOs abroad. In describing the core strategy of 
the period, Thomas Carothers describes a democracy template: 
The template’s third category is civil society. The template ideal is a 
diverse, active, and independent civil society that articulates the inter-
ests of citizens and holds government accountable to citizens. U.S. de-
mocracy promoters often highlight nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) involved in public interest advocacy, such as human rights or 
women’s issues, as a vital form of civil society.73 
As a result, the promotion of the NGO sector became part of the stand-
ard aid and technical assistance package of democracy solutions offered 
to transitional countries.74 Aid programs explicitly targeting NGO sup-
port “have grown more and more common, and are now part of U.S. de-
mocracy aid portfolios in most countries. The United States is scarcely 
alone in this regard. Many other donor countries, as well as private aid 
organizations, have embraced the concept.”75 In parts of the world where 
                                                                                                             
 68. See THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE 
29 (1999) [hereinafter CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD]. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See id. at 36. 
 71. See id. at 29. 
 72. See id. at 40. 
 73. Id. at 87. 
 74. See id. at 90. 
 75. Id. at 207; see also CAROTHERS, ASSESSING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, supra note 
41, at 2 (noting financial support from Canada, Great Britain, Germany, Holland, Den-
mark, and Sweden as well as multilateral organizations such as the U.N., the European 
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there had been few independent NGOs operating before the 1990s—such 
as Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa—aid from the Global North 
fueled an NGO boom.76 
Another important policy development that converged with the NGO 
explosion was the heightened influence of Washington Consensus eco-
nomic development policies in the early 1980s.77 The Washington Con-
sensus describes a set of ideas and policies pursued by the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development 
Bank, think tanks, and other policy makers during this period.78 It is of-
ten understood as a “reaction against . . . extensive [government] inter-
ventionism” in favor of neo-liberal policies, emphasizing instead greater 
reliance on market forces.79 Accordingly, with funding scaled back, 
many social services previously carried out by governments were either 
eliminated or turned over to the nonprofit sector.80 Thus, new opportuni-
ties emerged for the private philanthropic sector to grow and to provide 
services left in the void generated by the new development policies.81 
After a decade or so, the Washington Consensus began to break down 
as international financial institutions themselves began to question the 
effectiveness of the approach. “Towards the end of the 1980s, the oppo-
sition to such policies had been gathering strength through observing 
how they had neglected the consequences for what has become known as 
‘adjustment with a human face.’”82 Thus the post-Washington Consensus 
emphasized the social goals of development. Interestingly, this new fo-
cus also contributed to the growth of the nonprofit sector, this time be-
                                                                                                             
Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Organization of 
American States, and the Organization of African Unity). 
 76. See CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD, supra note 68, at 215. 
 77. See John Weeks & Howard Stein, Washington Consensus, in THE ELGAR 
COMPANION TO DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 676, 676 (David Alexander Clark ed., 2006) 
(“The Consensus reigned hegemonic in international development policy from the early 
1980s to the mid-1990s.”); Robin Broad & John Cavanagh, The Death of the Washington 
Consensus?, 16 WORLD POL’Y J. 79, 80 (“The power of the Washington Consensus over 
development theory and practice in the 1980s and 1990s is hard to overstate.”). 
 78. See BEN FINE, SOCIAL CAPITAL VERSUS SOCIAL THEORY 132 (2001). 
 79. See id. at 134. 
 80. See LESTER M. SALAMON & ALAN J. ABRAMSON, THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 
PROJECT, THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 3 (1982); Thomas Kelley, 
Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of America’s Tangled Nonprofit 
Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2461 (2005). 
 81. See KATHARINE NEILSON RANKIN, THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF MARKETS: 
ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN NEPAL 22 (2004) (noting that civil 
society organizations sought to “fill the vacuum left by the restructuring of the welfare 
state mandated by economic liberalization processes in countries around the world”). 
 82. FINE, supra note 78, at 135. 
2012] THE ANTI-NGO MOVEMENT 477 
cause the funding institutions and donor agencies realized that NGOs 
could be powerful development partners. As a result, as commentators 
today observe: 
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have become key mediators of 
political, economic, and social change in the post-Washington Consen-
sus era. While development experts have lauded NGOs as efficient 
conduits for aid, and pointed to the NGO “boom” as an indicator of 
democratizing civil societies, anthropologists have focused on the myr-
iad ways NGOs help to remake forms of social organization and gov-
ernment.83 
In addition to the aforementioned social and political factors, several 
other forces also may have contributed to the accelerated growth of 
NGOs and their networks. During the past two decades, the world has 
experienced dramatic increases in private philanthropy due to extensive 
expansion of private wealth, unprecedented globalization, and a spread 
of communications technologies that have spurred the growth of global 
NGOs. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 83. Analiese M. Richard, Mediating Dilemmas: Local NGOs and Rural Development 
in Neoliberal Mexico, 32 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 166, 166 (2009). 
478 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 37:2 
FIGURE 3. Percentage of Major U.S. Foundation Grants Allocated 
to International Giving84 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notably, private wealth and private philanthropy have both greatly ex-
panded and become more globalized.85 Accordingly, as wealthy donors 
devoted new and more resources to the nonprofit sector, support for in-
ternational NGOs and organizations in the developing world increased 
correspondingly. For example, FIGURE 3 shows the growth in interna-
tional giving by the largest foundations in the United States.86 According 
                                                                                                             
 84. These data are drawn from the following sources: STEVEN LAWRENCE & REINA 
MUKAI, FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON FUNDING PRIORITIES 26 
(2010) [hereinafter FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2010]; STEVEN LAWRENCE ET AL., 
FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON FUNDING PRIORITIES 26 (2009) 
[hereinafter FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2009]; JOSEFINA ATIENZA & REINA MUKAI, 
FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON FUNDING PRIORITIES 20 (2008) 
[hereinafter FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2008]; JOSEFINA ATIENZA ET AL., FOUND. CTR., 
FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON FUNDING PRIORITIES 20 (2007); JOSEFINA 
ATIENZA & ASHLEY BAILEY, FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON 
FUNDING PRIORITIES 25 (2006); JOSEFINA ATIENZA & JENNIE ALTMAN, FOUND. CTR., 
FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON FUNDING PRIORITIES 19 (2005); JOSEFINA 
ATIENZA & LESLIE MARINO, FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON 
FUNDING PRIORITIES 19 (2004). 
 85. See EBERLY, supra note 67, at 16 (noting increases in families with assets over 
$30 million, the growth rate of billionaires, and the geographic distribution of the super-
wealthy); Garry W. Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?, 61 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 753, 763 (2011) [hereinafter Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?]. 
 86. The Foundation Center’s annual study is based on a sample of large foundations. 
For example, the 2008 sampling base included more than 800 of the 1000 largest founda-
tions and the fifteen largest foundations in nearly every state, ranked by total grant giving 
and a sampling of other foundations. Consequently, the sample is not a stratified random 
sample of the nation’s full set of private foundations. In addition, the composition of the 
set varies from year to year. See FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2010, supra note 84, at 39–
40. 
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to the Foundation Center’s annual study of foundation giving trends, ap-
proximately 14% of grant dollars were allocated to international giving 
in 2002. That figure rose to almost 25% in 2008. As global civil society 
scholar Don Eberly explains, “Fueling the growth in the nonprofit sector 
is a burgeoning private philanthropy, arising from unprecedented new 
wealth in America and from tax code incentives to channel portions of 
that wealth toward the social good. The number of private foundations 
has tripled since the early 1990s.”87 
Globalization and improved communications technologies also have 
helped propel NGO growth. Many commentators have discussed how the 
rapidly evolving global marketplace has changed commerce and culture. 
Philanthropy is similarly affected. Heightened awareness of global hu-
man needs and a growing sense of interconnectivity among peoples 
across national borders have led to increased interaction, information, 
and access to funding for international NGOs and locally-based NGOs 
operating overseas.88 Improvements in communications technologies 
“helped transform the world of NGOs.”89 The widespread diffusion of 
knowledge and information through facsimile machines, telecommunica-
tions, and the Internet over the past two decades permitted smaller organ-
izations to flourish, facilitated collaborations, and provided means for 
organizations to communicate their messages without intermediaries or 
government restrictions.90 This “advent of cheap and instant communica-
tions” enabled NGOs to become effective focal points for mobilizating 
people.91 
II. THE ANTI-NGO MOVEMENT 
For many, the paradigmatic nonprofit organization is a tireless advo-
cate addressing important social issues such as human rights, economic 
development and poverty reduction, environmental justice, housing ine-
quality, health disparities, women’s rights, and racial discrimination, 
among others. In the United States, nonprofits are frequently considered 
positive forces that promote the public good, prompt and monitor gov-
                                                                                                             
 87. Id. 
 88. See KARNS & MINGST, supra note 45, at 226 (discussing globalization has a con-
tributing factor to NGO growth). 
 89. McGann & Johnstone, supra note 15, at 164. 
 90. See id. at 164–65. 
 91. Hildy Teegen & Jonathan P. Doh, Conclusion: Globalization and the Future of 
NGO Influence, in GLOBALIZATION AND NGOS, supra note 29, at 203, 214. 
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ernment, and provide important connections between local, national, or 
international citizens.92 
It is interesting that anti-NGO criticism is not limited to just one tradi-
tional ideological camp. To the degree that the left/right political contin-
uum (in the way those terms are used in the United States) is a useful 
construct to categorize criticisms, the most vocal and organized anti-
NGO forces are associated with the right. Elements on the left, however, 
have also expressed serious concerns about NGOs. 
Given the rapid growth and the enthusiastic promotion of NGOs, it 
should not be surprising that critics have emerged attempting to de-halo 
the nonprofit sector. Although the anti-NGO view is not widely shared, 
careful analysis of opinion data may not be entirely comforting to non-
profit advocates. The introduction of this Article noted some good news 
for nonprofits drawn from public opinion survey data: nonprofit organi-
zations are among society’s most trusted institutions.93 Unfortunately, 
there is some worrisome data from public opinion surveys as well. 
In the United States, the aforementioned critical views also may reflect 
a broader disquiet among the general public about confidence in the en-
tire charitable sector. A survey of Americans, released in April 2008 by 
the Brookings Institution and the Organizational Performance Initiative 
at New York University’s Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public 
Service, found that public confidence in nonprofits was at contemporary 
lows.94 Thirty-four percent expressed “not too much” confidence or 
“none at all.”95 These figures are within the percentage of the margin of 
error of the record lows of 2002 (37%) covering the seven years in which 
data on that measure has been collected.96 Moreover, the survey found 
that since 2003, the majority of Americans rated the nonprofit sector 
“somewhat good” or worse with regard to performance in “helping peo-
ple.”97 As nonprofit scholar Paul Light, the author of the Brookings 
study, highlights in his report, “somewhat good” is not an encouraging 
rating. He writes, “[f]ew Americans believe that ‘somewhat good’ is a 
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positive rating in other areas of their lives—e.g., somewhat good surgery, 
somewhat good food, or somewhat good airplanes.”98 In fact, the number 
of respondents indicating the sector has done a “very good” job steadily 
declined from more than one third of the sample population in 2003 to a 
quarter in 2008.99 
To be fair, general survey results should not be mistaken for wide-
spread acceptance of anti-NGO viewpoints. But the data suggest that the 
reservoir of goodwill assumed to exist for nonprofit organizations is vul-
nerable. Accordingly, NGO critics may be able to tap into an existing 
undercurrent of skepticism that will further fuel an anti-nonprofit senti-
ment. In addition, the results demonstrate that the more vocal critics are 
not extreme outliers and suggest that critiques are unlikely to fade in the 
near future. 
Of course there is no homogeneous set of NGO institutions. NGOs are 
characterized by their diversity and bring a wide range of perspectives 
and voices into the public discourse.100 Yet many critics of NGOs do not 
see the benefits of such diversity and pluralism. Instead they see threats. 
Of the vocal critics, the right seems to be focused on the largest and 
best-established nonprofits with political views often deemed “liberal.”101 
Generally, the right is concerned that these progressive NGOs are given 
too much credence and taken too seriously by governments, media, cor-
porations, and others. In contrast, the left is skeptical of the organization-
al power of nonprofits. They view the growth and reliance on nonprofits 
as a means of advancing the privatization of political affairs and as a sys-
tem controlled and manipulated by the wealthy to advance moderate so-
lutions at the expense of radical social change. Under this view, the dom-
inant network of international foundations and NGOs operating at the 
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highest levels has been disparagingly referred to as the “non-profit indus-
trial complex.”102 Finally, many government leaders have expressed hos-
tility toward NGOs and a fear of undue international interference. Gov-
ernment bodies, particularly states that are targeted by NGO human 
rights and environmental policy campaigns, have denounced NGOs and 
pursued new legal restrictions aimed at curtailing their activities, discred-
iting their motives, or silencing their voices. 
A. Critics from the Right 
For the anti-neoliberal globalization movement that protested domestic 
and multinational corporations, the dramatic rallies held outside the 
World Trade Organization in November 1999 in Seattle103 represent the 
key moment in that particular counter-mobilization effort. For the right’s 
nascent protest against NGOs, if there was a single galvanizing moment 
it may have been a staid academic conference held in Washington, D.C., 
during the summer of 2003. This conference was organized by the Amer-
ican Enterprise Institute (“AEI”), a powerful Washington think tank with 
ties to the right, and the Institute of Public Affairs, a similarly conserva-
tive Australian think tank.104 The program criticized NGOs as unac-
countable and undermining government sovereignty.105 Out of that con-
ference, AEI introduced a collaborative initiative with the Federalist So-
ciety for Law and Public Policy Studies called “NGO Watch.”106 
NGO Watch is a political campaign and website designed to monitor 
and critique international nonprofit organizations.107 The primary focus 
of the NGO Watch project appears to be the activities of large, estab-
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lished, “liberal” institutions focused on international matters, such as 
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross, and the World Wildlife Fund.108 Originally 
launched as its own program in 2003, NGO Watch has since rebranded 
and expanded into a broader Global Governance Watch initiative, cover-
ing the United Nations, NGOs, and other entities with influence over in-
ternational law and policy.109 
In explaining the rationale for the project, NGO Watch highlights ac-
countability concerns. Its original mission statement contemptuously 
asks, “What is their [NGOs] agenda? . . . . And to whom are they ac-
countable?”110 Additionally, in explaining the roots of NGO Watch, 
AEI’s Danielle Pletka, Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy 
studies, stated that the need arose from the conviction that influential 
“NGOs are not accountable . . . . not transparent. NGOs are not elect-
ed.”111 
The project’s founding mission statement presents the “growth,” 
“power,” and “influence” of NGOs as a cause of concern.112 The state-
ment alleges that “[m]any [NGO] groups have strayed beyond their orig-
inal mandates and assumed quasi-governmental roles. Increasingly, non-
governmental organizations are not just accredited observers at interna-
tional organizations, they are full-fledged decision-makers.”113 This 
statement suggests that the sponsors of NGO Watch regard more limited, 
modest NGO goals and activities as acceptable and proper (i.e., their 
                                                                                                             
 108. See, e.g., Esther Kaplan, Follow The Money: Bush Has Revived the Christian 
Right Through Direct Federal Largesse, NATION, Nov. 1, 2004, at 20 (identifying such 
organizations as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Human Rights Watch, the 
Audubon Society, and Planned Parenthood as targets of NGO Watch); Philip Mendes, 
Editorial, The Hidden Agenda of the NGO Wars, CANBERRA TIMES (Australia) Mar. 4, 
2005, at A11 (discussing NGO Watch, AEI, and IPA and their attacks on international 
NGOs, including Greenpeace, Amnesty International, and the World Wildlife Fund). 
 109. See Keeping an Eye on National Sovereignty, AEI NEWSL. (Am. Enter. Inst. for 
Pub. Policy Research, Wash. D.C.), June 1, 2008 [hereinafter Keeping an Eye], available 
at http:// www.aei.org/article/28080. 
 110. NGO Watch Mission Statement, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, 
http://www.aei.org/files/2003/06/11/20030612_NGOWATCHannouncement.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2012) (on file with author). 
 111. Keeping an Eye, supra note 109 (quoting Danielle Pletka of AEI). 
 112. See NGO Watch Mission Statement, supra note 110 (“Recent years have seen an 
unprecedented growth in the power and influence of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). While it is true that many NGOs remain true to grassroots authenticity conjured 
up in images of protest and sacrifice, it is also true that non-governmental organizations 
are now serious business.”). 
 113. Id. 
484 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 37:2 
“original mandates”), but sponsors see an inappropriate shift by certain 
nonprofits in their sense of organizational mission and scope of activity. 
AEI, the primary funder of NGO Watch, has deep ties to the business 
community. Initially formed as a small business group in 1938 called the 
American Enterprise Association, the organization moved to Washington 
in 1943.114 Over the years, AEI has become an influential conservative 
think tank, promoting free-market capitalism, deregulation, and other 
neoconservative ideas.115 With assets in excess of $135 million, AEI has 
substantial resources to deploy,116 numerous conservative backers,117 and 
close ties to the Republican establishment.118 Today its board of trustees 
consists primarily of businessmen119 from the corporate and financial 
sectors, including senior executives from prominent multinational corpo-
rations (e.g., International Paper Company, MeadWestvaco Corporation) 
and investment firms (e.g., The Carlyle Group, Greenhill & Co., Inc.).120 
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Several observers consider the NGO Watch campaign an orchestrated 
effort to silence and marginalize NGOs. For example, Canadian journal-
ist Naomi Klein writes that: 
[t]he war on NGOs is being fought on two clear fronts. One buys the si-
lence and complicity of mainstream humanitarian and religious groups 
by offering lucrative reconstruction contracts. The other marginalizes 
and criminalizes more independent-minded NGOs by claiming that 
their work is a threat to democracy. The U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) is in charge of handing out the carrots, while 
the American Enterprise Institute, the most powerful think tank in 
Washington, D.C., is wielding the sticks.”121 
 
In addition to NGO Watch, other organizations adopted similar ap-
proaches or launched coordinated campaigns. For instance, Australia’s 
Institute of Public Affairs has published several critiques of NGOs.122 
The Capital Research Center (“CRC”), a right-leaning Washington, 
D.C.-based research institute,123 has also launched a nonprofit watch 
campaign. CRC’s GreenWatch targets nonprofits working on environ-
mental issues, homing in on EarthJustice (formerly known as the Sierra 
Club Legal Defense Fund), the Environmental Defense Fund, Green-
peace, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and the Sierra Club, 
among others.124 
The most substantive criticisms from the right contend that NGOs un-
dermine national sovereignty, question NGO representativeness with 
respect to the constituencies they aim to help, and claim NGOs are op-
posed to free markets and capitalism. As political scientist Kim Reimann 
explains, “[a]ccording to these [politically conservative and right-of-
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center] critics, NGOs and their rising influence in national and interna-
tional politics threaten democracy, capitalism and sovereignty of the na-
tion-state.”125 This viewpoint is common across many conservative crit-
ics of NGOs. 
Many conservatives believe that NGOs undermine democratic practic-
es and national sovereignty.126 In this view, NGOs exert pressure and 
exercise influence outside of established institutional political systems, 
thereby permitting special interest groups to thwart the will of the people 
acting through their legitimate governmental leaders.127 Ultimately, this 
is seen as part of a threat to the nation-state system, promoting a system 
of “global governance” in conjunction with the United Nations and inter-
national law.128 These same critics are generally hostile to the United 
Nations and international treaties that limit sovereignty. Connections be-
tween the U.N. and NGOs, international standards, and other constraints 
of global governance are viewed as a “conspiracy to promote liberal in-
ternationalism”129 at the expense of the will of the people as a whole 
(represented by sovereign governments).130 Generally, such charges chal-
lenge the perceived legitimacy of NGOs to participate in domestic and 
international politics. 
A secondary critique questions the legitimacy of NGO representative-
ness to adequately express positions on public issues or advocate on be-
half of others. This line of assault focuses on the voice of the NGOs, 
most often when those organizations advocate on behalf of a constituen-
cy or geographic area, typically one that may be poor, subordinated, or 
otherwise considered less powerful. Specifically, in these instances, 
NGOs are often derided as self-appointed guardians that advocate on 
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behalf of special interests and are unrepresentative of the general public 
or those they claim to represent.131 This concern is heightened when dis-
tant charitable organizations or funders, usually in the Global North, are 
seen to be influencing or speaking for peoples or problems in the Global 
South. 
Finally, right-wing critics claim that NGOs are opposed to corpora-
tions and undermine capitalism and free markets.132 In this view the pro-
motion of corporate social responsibility efforts by international NGOs is 
detrimental and insidious. In particular, these critics believe that NGO 
advocacy campaigns aimed at corporations “cause[] reputational damage 
to corporations . . . [and] hamper[] capitalism by creating unrealistic ex-
pectations for what corporations are responsible for and by misinforming 
the public of the various misdeeds committed by corporations.”133 
Clearly, critics on the right are uncomfortable with NGOs and civil so-
ciety serving as a potent counterweight to the power of government and 
the private sector. The real fear of the right is that government-like pow-
er will expand the influence of NGOs. Cloaked in the neutral language of 
accountability, the attacks on NGOs reveal hostility to private collective 
action that is not animated by profit. The right posits a democratically-
elected government that is accountable to voters and a free-market eco-
nomic system that is accountable to shareholders as the only legitimate 
sources of power in a society. Accordingly, NGO Watch and similar ef-
forts represent a subtle assault on civil society, a campaign orchestrated 
to limit the effectiveness of “liberal” organizations and cabin the strength 
of organized independent voices represented through nonprofit corporate 
forms. 
B. Critics from the Left 
Those on the political left also voice skepticism about the role of 
NGOs and their increased influence in the modern world. Interestingly, a 
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large part of the left-wing criticisms of NGOs have been grounded in 
attacks of accountability, similar to the right-wing critique. The ideologi-
cal criticisms from the left can be divided into four general themes: ques-
tions about who benefits; questions about the value of local expertise; 
neocolonialism; and the deleterious impact of NGOs on individual citi-
zens, governments, and the relationships between the two. 
Where right-wing critics worry that NGOs diminish corporate power, 
left-wing critics argue the opposite, asserting that NGOs serve as agents 
furthering Western capitalist interests. Moreover, liberal critics suggest 
that the tax-exempt status of NGO donations wrongfully shifts decision-
making regarding resource allocation and distribution away from public 
processes and places such determinations in the hands of private corpora-
tions and individuals. Finally, the international NGOs have been criti-
cized for usurping decision-making authority from the domestic govern-
ments of the countries that receive aid. 
The first accountability concern of the left is the question of who bene-
fits. Specifically, the concern is that NGOs are not adequately accounta-
ble to the citizens NGOs claim to serve. The left’s view of accountability 
differs somewhat from the right’s concerns, which focus on sham repre-
sentativeness and organizational structures in NGOs.134 Instead, the left 
is primarily afraid that NGOs reflect a false representativeness that privi-
leges self-serving interests or specialized expertise at the expense of gen-
uine grassroots interests and voices in the countries in which they oper-
ate.135 Some critics believe there is a “worrying disconnection” between 
the policies international NGOs propound and the best interests of the 
people that the groups proclaim to serve.136 Thus, critics charge that 
NGOs push their own agendas, ignore indigenous individuals’ input 
when formulating goals and, as a result, often advocate for policies that 
are not in a country’s best interests.137 A Brazilian activist has similarly 
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argued—on the subject of professional women in NGOs—that they 
“want[] to control the agenda . . . and [want] to confine the struggle to 
exclusively feminist issues . . . . These . . . NGO professionals are author-
itarian and with a colonialist mentality; they have nobody behind them 
except their wealthy outside backers.”138 
Another increasingly common criticism of NGOs raised by the left is 
that NGOs protect the interests of corporate and government donors. 
Specifically, some critics, recognizing that NGOs increasingly depend on 
donations from wealthy entities and governments to fund their activities, 
have observed that NGO policies are more responsive to donors than to 
those the organizations seek to serve.139 Of course, this is somewhat iron-
ic because being responsive to financial backers is often viewed as a 
form of accountability.140 But there are many alternative forms of ac-
countability and groups to which a nonprofit organization may be ac-
countable. 
Other critics worry that when the interests of financial backers take a 
front seat, accountability to the marginalized people served by NGOs 
may suffer, creating an accountability paradox. A stronger version of this 
critique argues that corporate donations are motivated by the desire to 
enhance a corporation’s public image, achieve policy development that 
benefits the corporation, or both.141 
These twin motivations—corporate donors’ motivation to seek benefit 
and NGOs motivation to obtain funding—create a system in which 
NGOs are really advancing, or are perceived to advance, policies that 
benefit the interests of wealthy corporate donors.142 In doing so, funding 
pressures may compromise NGO autonomy and limit their ability to pur-
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sue radical social change.143 As mentioned earlier, one activist argues 
that corporations grow wealthy by exploiting workers while they simul-
taneously receive benefits from making “charitable” donations, calling 
the system the “non-profit industrial complex.”144 
Additionally, left-wing critics claim that the growing number of well-
established international NGOs with staffed professionals only exacer-
bates this problem. Donors tend to favor high-profile NGOs that are 
driven by the views and interests of policy experts in their respective 
fields.145 These subject-matter experts, however, often have no connec-
tion to the communities for which these experts advocate, do not attempt 
to build grassroots support for their policies, and fail to establish mean-
ingful relationships with the citizenry on the ground.146 As a result, 
Western expertise may be privileged and may ultimately frustrate the 
voice of indigenous communities in the political development of their 
regions. 
These concerns about NGO accountability are echoed by scholars and 
activists in developing nations. The neocolonialism criticisms contend 
that NGOs are advancing “a new era of Western economic and political 
imperialism.”147 Tamsin Bradley, in his analysis of NGO activity in 
South Asia, writes “The NGO operates as a government institution and 
exercises its might by marginalizing the developing world . . . . Individu-
als within target communities are therefore treated as passive subjects 
and are denied the agency to shape their own futures.”148 Bradley con-
tends that NGOs may advocate only those policies that fit within domi-
nant Western ideology.149 He argues that the promotion of limited West-
ern viewpoints restricts the communities served by NGOs to what the 
Western world traditionally considers to be “development,” thereby im-
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 144. Andrea Smith, Introduction: The Revolution Will Not Be Funded to THE 
REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE FUNDED: BEYOND THE NON-PROFIT INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, 
supra note 102, at 1, 8–9; see also de Almeida, supra note 138, at 186 (noting that “there 
is a very fine line between ‘milking the system’ and being milked by the system.”). 
 145. Smith, supra note 144, at 10. 
 146. See id. at 10 (“these purported experts are generally not part of the communities 
they advocate for and hence do not contribute to building grassroots leadership”); see 
also TAMSIN BRADLEY, CHALLENGING THE NGOS 4 (2006) (“[t]hose targeted to receive 
aid are not involved in the decision-making . . . instead Western constructions of 
knowledge determine who is qualified to know and act . . . . [This] creates the develop-
ment ‘expert’ (typically white, middle/upper-class and educated).”). 
 147. Reimann, supra note 123, at 47 (describing neocolonialism critiques of NGOs). 
 148. BRADLEY, supra note 146, at 6–7. 
 149. See id. at 3. 
2012] THE ANTI-NGO MOVEMENT 491 
posing another form of colonialism through charity.150 Additionally, 
scholars analyzing the impact of NGOs in the Arab world suggest that 
Arab nations often view NGOs as “elitist and corrupt organizations with 
no accountability . . . [that] promot[e] western agendas.”151 These are 
merely a few illustrations of a sizable concern that NGOs subvert the true 
interests of the communities they claim to serve in favor of their own 
agendas.152 
Critics on the left also voice concerns about the negative impact of 
NGOs on state power and on the relationship between the citizen and the 
state. First, some regard the shift toward reliance on NGO-based aid 
models with suspicion because NGOs may be used as tools for advanc-
ing neoliberalism, a conservative ideology that promotes a hegemonic 
anti-state, private-oriented, capitalist system.153 Michael Hardt and Anto-
nio Negri explain that: 
Some critics assert that NGOs, since they are outside and often in con-
flict with state power, are compatible with and serve the neoliberal pro-
ject of global capital. While global capital attacks the powers of the na-
tion-state from above, they argue, the NGOs function as a ‘parallel 
strategy from below’ and present the ‘community face’ of neoliberal-
ism.154 
Second, other critics have complained that NGOs ease what otherwise 
might be considered government burdens, thereby removing public pres-
                                                                                                             
 150. Id. at 3 (“The West requires proof that the developing country is competent in the 
task of changing itself in line with the Western model of modernization.”). 
 151. Nicola Pratt, Hegemony and Counter-hegemony in Egypt: Advocacy NGOs, Civil 
Society, and the State, in NGOS AND GOVERNANCE IN THE ARAB WORLD, supra note 31, 
at 123, 124. 
 152. See generally Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?, supra note 85, at 
799, 807–08 (discussing pressures of modern philanthropy that limits community-based, 
bottom-up problem solving); Julia Paley, The Paradox of Participation: Civil Society and 
Democracy in Chile, 24 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. no. 1, 2001, at 1 (document-
ing the rise of civil society—including NGOs—in Chile and suggesting that advocacy by 
these private groups often had a deleterious effect on the democratic participation of 
community members). 
 153. See Reimann, supra note 125, at 47 (describing a common left critique that NGOs 
are an important component of the neoliberal model); see also David Rieff, The False 
Dawn of Civil Society, NATION, Feb. 22, 1999, at 11, 12 (“[T]he idea of civil society be-
gins to look less like a way of fostering democratic rights and responsive governments 
and more like part of the dominant ideology of the post-cold war period: liberal market 
capitalism.”). 
 154. HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 30, at 312–13 (quoting James Petras, Imperialism 
and NGOs in Latin America, MONTHLY REV., Dec. 1997, at 10–27) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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sure and support to devote public resources to address social problems.155 
In other words, shifting decision-making regarding societal problems to 
private decision-makers undermines opportunities for collective prob-
lem-solving. 
Third, critics also argue that “were it not for charitable deductions al-
lowed by tax laws, [the amount of the tax benefit] would have become 
public funds to be allocated through the governmental process under the 
controlling power of the electorate as a whole.”156 Thus, the argument 
goes, NGO strength systematically weakens and “decapitates” govern-
ments.157 Moreover, a concern here is that corporate donors and wealthy 
individuals, who direct tax-privileged monies to NGOs of their choice, 
are not representative of the general public.158 
C. Government Responses 
The accountability arguments—from the left and the right—that NGOs 
exercise independent power (either as a handmaiden of or a challenge to 
corporate interests) are not lost on governments. As a result, govern-
ments have proposed and pursued a range of strategies to regulate, man-
age, limit, and even co-opt NGOs. Although not all NGOs perceive 
                                                                                                             
 155. See Christopher Collier, NGOs, the Poor, and Local Government, 6 DEV. IN PRAC. 
244, 248 (1996) (“Projects in which NGOs use their own resources to deliver goods and 
services—which local government should be delivering but is not—lead the population to 
reduce its expectations of what local government can or should be doing for it.”); Issa G. 
Shivji, Reflections on NGOs in Tanzania: What We Are, What We Are Not, and What We 
Ought to Be, 14 DEV. PRAC. 689, 691 (2004) (“NGOs let the government off the hook as 
it abdicates its own responsibility.”); Brendan Martin, New Leaf or Fig Leaf?: The Chal-
lenge of the New Washington Consensus, PUB. WORLD 16 (2000), 
http://www.publicworld.org/files/newleaf.pdf (“Societies which depend on [NGO and 
development] largess to meet their basic health and education needs are neither sustaina-
ble, democratic nor equitable.”). Cf. Sins of the Secular Missionaries, ECONOMIST, Jan. 
29, 2000, at 25, 26 (“Larger NGOs have pledged not to act as ‘instruments of government 
foreign policy.’ But at times they are seen as just that. Governments are more willing to 
pay groups to deliver humanitarian aid to a war zone than to deliver it themselves.”). 
 156. Ahn, supra note 142, at 65. 
 157. See ERICA BORNSTEIN, THE SPIRIT OF DEVELOPMENT: PROTESTANT NGOS, 
MORALITY, AND ECONOMICS IN ZIMBABWE 16–17 (2003); Joseph Hanlon, An ‘Ambitious 
and Extensive Political Agenda’: The Role of NGOs and the AID Industry, in GLOBAL 
INSTITUTIONS AND LOCAL EMPOWERMENT 132, 138 (Kendall Stiles ed., 2000). 
 158. See Ahn, supra note 142, at 64–66 (documenting the difference in demographic 
composition between corporate board of directors and the public as a whole). It is inter-
esting to note that this argument implicitly assumes government decision-making is pref-
erable to that of wealthy interests for distributing aid. Because critics of the left have 
heavily criticized governments for donating to NGOs based on political motivations, 
however, this assumption may be questionable. 
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themselves to be engaged with politics, their activities are always an ex-
pression of values.159 As a result, national governments have long been 
“cautious about the possibility of NGOs becoming a separate political 
force and influencing existing partisan politics.”160 In addition, as dis-
cussed in Part I above, in both the developed and developing world, 
NGOs can pressure local governments, insert themselves into business-
government relationships,161 and exert influence over significant portions 
of some countries gross domestic product through “relief donations and 
trade sanctions.”162 
Accordingly, around the world some governments and their most sen-
ior officials are openly hostile to or critical of NGOs. For instance, John 
Bolton, who would go on to serve as United States Ambassador to the 
United Nations during the George W. Bush administration, compared 
NGO involvement in international affairs to fascism. He argued: 
[I]t is precisely the detachment from governments that makes interna-
tional civil society so troubling, at least for democracies . . . . Indeed, 
the civil society idea actually suggests a “corporativist” approach to in-
ternational decision-making that is dramatically troubling for democrat-
ic theory . . . . Mussolini would smile on the Forum of Civil Society. 
Americanists do not.163 
More than just offering criticisms, a range of governments, including 
some in democratic societies, have adopted or proposed anti-NGO laws 
that create complex and burdensome registration requirements, impose 
                                                                                                             
 159. See David A. Brennen, A Diversity Theory of Charitable Tax Exemption—Beyond 
Efficiency, Through Critical Race Theory, Toward Diversity, 4 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 24 
(2006); Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of The Federal Income Tax Exemption For Char-
itable Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419, 430 (1998); 
Evelyn A. Lewis, Charitable Waste: Consideration of a “Waste Not, Want Not” Tax, 30 
VA. TAX REV. 39, 68 (2010). 
 160. Jude L. Fernando & Alan W. Heston, The Role of NGOs: Charity and Empower-
ment: NGOs Between States, Markets, and Civil Society, 554 ANNALS 8, 13 (1997). Cf. 
Jenkins, Soft Power, supra note 14, at 790–801 (discussing international philanthropy—
including that from the United States—as a supportive element of public diplomacy and a 
source of soft power). 
 161. See generally Jonathan P. Doh, Nongovernmental Organizations, Corporate 
Strategy, and Public Policy: NGOs as Agents of Change, in GLOBALIZATION AND NGOS, 
supra note 29, at 1, 4–12 (discussing the multiple roles NGOs play in business-
government interface). 
 162. See Jone L. Pearce, Foreword to GLOBALIZATION AND NGOS, supra note 29, at xi, 
xiii (“NGOs . . . can influence the direction of 10 or even 30 percent of the country’s 
gross domestic product.”). 
 163. John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
205, 217–18 (2000). 
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intrusive and invasive oversight, or restrict associational rights, freedom 
of speech, or access to financial support. In fact, “[i]n the ten years since 
the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights Defenders was adopted, at least 
twenty countries have adopted laws imposing legal and regulatory re-
straints on NGOs.”164 In one extreme case, the government of Ethiopia—
in an effort to reduce foreign influence—passed a law in 2009 banning 
NGOs with more than 10% of international funding from engaging “in 
any activities relating to democracy, justice, or human rights.”165 In Aus-
tralia, the “neo-liberal and neoconservative politics of the [John] Howard 
government (while in power from 1996–2007) recast the idealism of 
NGO charters as socially unfashionable and naïve, while the Howard 
government’s policies sought to undermine their effectiveness.”166 
Scholars have accused the Howard government of attempting to “silence 
dissent” through denigration, bullying, public criticism, and defunding of 
NGOs.167 
Government efforts to impede NGOs through legal, regulatory, and ex-
tralegal channels demonstrate the precarious political climate and the 
power of anti-NGO sentiment in some countries. Governments have used 
a variety of strategies to attack NGOs, including expulsion, control of 
activities, attempts to overwhelm through bureaucracy, and co-optation. 
This is not an exhaustive list of strategies, but rather a set of examples. 
Drawn from a wide range of countries around the world, the following 
cases provide examples of government efforts hostile to nonprofit enti-
ties. 
1. Expulsion of NGOs 
For many years, Sudan—Africa’s largest country—has been beset by 
conflict. Sudan has been ravaged by two waves of civil war. The first 
brutal round took 1.5 million lives, the second (and familiar Darfur con-
flict) resulted in the deaths of over 200,000 and 2 million fled their 
                                                                                                             
 164. Jennifer M. Gleason & Elizabeth Mitchell, Will the Confluence between Human 
Rights and the Environment Continue to Flow? Threats to the Rights of Environmental 
Defenders to Collaborate and Speak Out, 11 OR. REV. INT’L L. 267, 274 (2009). 
 165. See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME [UNDP], HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010, at 63 
(2010), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Chapter3_reprint.pdf. 
 166. James Arvanitakis, Surviving Neo-Liberalism: NGOs under the Howard Years, 6 
NEBULA, no. 3, 2009, at 53, 54, available at 
http://www.nobleworld.biz/images/4Arvanitakis.pdf. 
 167. Id. at 59–64; see also Sarah Maddison & Clive Hamilton, Non-government Or-
ganisations, in SILENCING DISSENT: HOW THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT IS CONTROLLING 
PUBLIC OPINION AND STIFLING DEBATE 78–100 (Clive Hamilton & Sarah Maddison eds., 
2007). 
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homes.168 Sudan, notorious for its human rights abuses,169 has drawn in-
tense international criticism, particularly from humanitarian NGOs.170 It 
                                                                                                             
 168. See Sudan Profile, BBC NEWS (Nov. 29, 2011), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/820864.stm#media; see also Perry S. 
Bechky, Darfur, Divestment, and Dialogue, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 823, 828 (“Sudan’s 
postcolonial history is marked by bloodshed.”); Sudan, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2011), 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/sudan/index.html
?scp=1-spot&sq=sudan&st=cse (then follow “Read More . . . ” hyperlink) (estimating 
that Africa’s longest-running civil war, between north and south Sudan, killed approxi-
mately 2.2 million people, and describing the Darfur conflict as “one of the world’s worst 
humanitarian crises”). 
 169. See Darfur Tops U.S. List of Worst Human Rights Abuses, USA TODAY (Mar. 6, 
2007), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-03-06-human-
rights_N.htm?csp=34&loc=interstitialskip. 
 170. See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, A Darfur Envoy, N.Y. TIMES ON THE GROUND (Apr. 
16, 2006, 7:34 PM), http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2006/04/16/a-darfur-
envoy/?scp=20&sq=darfur%20campaign&st=cse. According to the United States De-
partment of State’s 2009 Human Rights Report on Sudan, many human rights abuses 
occurred in Sudan: 
The following human rights abuses occurred in Sudan: abridgement of citizens’ 
right to change their government; extrajudicial and other unlawful killings by 
government forces and other government-aligned groups throughout the coun-
try; torture, beatings, rape, and other cruel, inhumane treatment or punishment 
by security forces; harsh prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention, in-
communicado detention of suspected government opponents, and prolonged 
pretrial detention; executive interference with the judiciary and denial of due 
process; obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the expul-
sion of humanitarian NGOs; restrictions on privacy; restrictions on freedom of 
speech; restrictions on the press, including direct censorship; restrictions on 
freedoms of assembly, association, religion, and movement; harassment of 
IDPs; harassment and closure of human rights organizations; violence and dis-
crimination against women, including female genital mutilation (FGM); child 
abuse, including sexual violence and recruitment of child soldiers, particularly 
in Darfur; preventing international human rights observers from traveling 
to/within Sudan; trafficking in persons; discrimination and violence against 
ethnic minorities; denial of workers’ rights; and forced and child labor. 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: SUDAN (Mar. 11, 2010), 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135978.htm [hereinafter 2009 HUMAN 
RIGHTS REPORT: SUDAN]; see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush Signs Bill Allowing Sudan 
Divestment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2008, at A7 (describing Sudan Accountability and Di-
vestment Act and its “aim[] at pressur[ing] Sudan to end violence in Darfur region”). See 
generally Joyce Apsel, On Our Watch: The Genocide Convention and the Deadly, Ongo-
ing Case of Darfur and Sudan, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 53 (2008); Jamie A. Mathew, The 
Darfur Debate: Whether the ICC Should Determine that the Atrocities in Darfur Consti-
tute Genocide, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L. 517 (2006); William A. Schabas, Genocide, Crimes 
against Humanity, and Darfur: The Commission of Inquiry’s Findings on Genocide, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1703 (2006); Mary Deutsch Schneider, About Women, War and Dar-
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is estimated that more than seventy-five international NGOs work within 
the Darfur region of Sudan alone.171 
Not surprisingly, with much of the blame for the conflict in the region 
placed on the government, the government has been critical of and hos-
tile to NGO assistance.172 For example, in March 2009, after the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (“ICC”) issued an arrest warrant for Sudanese 
President Omar Hassan al-Bashir as a result of atrocities committed in 
Darfur,173 Sudanese officials expelled several international humanitarian 
NGOs from the country.174 To justify the expulsions, the government 
                                                                                                             
fur: The Continuing Quest for Gender Violence Justice, 83 N.D. L. REV. 915, 958–87 
(2007). 
 171. Sudan Vows to Expel Foreign NGOs from Darfur, GOOGLE NEWS (Mar. 16, 
2009), 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iqdYZGXFI3sxbQoAZo8FGuoe
wQyg (noting, as of March 2009, there were eighty-three NGOs in Darfur before thirteen 
were expelled). However, “[a]rmed conflict, poor transport infrastructure, and lack of 
government support have chronically obstructed the provision of humanitarian assistance 
to affected populations.” The World Factbook: Sudan, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/su.html (last updated 
Sept. 27, 2011). 
 172. See Public Statement, Amnesty Int’l, Sudan: Continuing Blockade of Humanitari-
an Aid (Apr. 4, 2006), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR54/010/2006/en/273ef57a-fa09-11dd-b1b0-
c961f7df9c35/afr540102006en.pdf (providing examples of actions by the Sudanese gov-
ernment to obstruct humanitarian aid in the country, including refusing to renew NGOs’ 
mandates and suspending and expelling NGOs). 
 173. See Marlise Simons & Neil MacFarquhar, Court Issues Arrest Warrant for Su-
dan’s Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2009, at A6 [hereinafter Simons & MacFarquhar, 
Court Issues Arrest Warrant for Sudan’s Leader]; ICC Issues Arrest Warrant for Sudan’s 
President, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 20, 2009), 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/04/20/icc-issues-arrest-warrant-sudan-s-president. 
[T]he ICC issued an arrest warrant for President Bashir as an indirect perpetra-
tor or as an indirect co-perpetrator of five counts of crimes against humanity—
murder, extermination, forcible transfer, torture, rape—and two counts of war 
crimes—intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population as such or 
against individual civilians not taking part in hostilities and pillaging in Darfur 
between March 2003 and July 2008. 
2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: SUDAN, supra note 170. See generally John E. Tanagho & 
John P. Hermina, The International Community Responds to Darfur: ICC Prosecution 
Renews Hope for International Justice, 6 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 367 (2009) (discuss-
ing the arrest warrant for President Bashir and the international response). 
 174. Sudan Vows to Expel Foreign NGOs from Darfur, supra note 171; see also Nich-
olas D. Kristof, Op-Ed, A President, a Boy and Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2009, at 
A31. 
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used general criticisms of NGO credibility and accountability, and ac-
cused the aid groups of having ulterior motives and serving as agents for 
the ICC.175 Almost immediately after the warrant was announced, the 
Sudanese government summoned several NGOs to a meeting at which 
they were ordered to leave the country or curb their work.176 The gov-
ernment then expelled thirteen international NGOs and revoked the li-
censes of three NGOs to operate, and ordered them to hand over their 
assets (including computers, vehicles, and other equipment).177 The af-
fected NGOs denied the charges, stressing their independence from for-
mal government entities and lack of ties with the ICC in particular.178 
                                                                                                             
One of Mr. Bashir’s first actions after the [ICC] arrest warrant was to undertake 
yet another crime against humanity: He expelled major international aid groups 
. . . . in effect, he is now preparing to massacre the Darfuri people in still anoth-
er way, for Darfuris are living in camps and depend on aid workers for food, 
water and health care. 
Id. 
 175. See Neil MacFarquhar & Marlise Simons, Bashir Defies War Crime Arrest Or-
der, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2009),  
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/06/world/africa/06sudan.html [hereinafter MacFar-
quhar & Simons, Bashir Defies War Crime Arrest Order]; Louis Charbonneau, Sudan 
Expulsions of NGOs Leave Aid Gap—UN, REUTERS (Mar. 9, 2009), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN09481219. Confirming the expulsion of the NGOs, 
Sudanese Vice President Ali Osman Taha stated, “Whenever an organization takes hu-
manitarian aid as a cover to achieve a political agenda that affects the security of the 
[country] and its stability, measures are to be taken by law to protect the country and its 
interests.” Sudan Expels 10 Aid NGOs and Dissolves 2 Local Groups, SUDAN TRIB. (Mar. 
4, 2009), http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-expels-10-aid-NGOs-and,30382 [hereinaf-
ter Sudan Expels NGOs]. 
 176. See Simons & MacFarquhar, Court Issues Arrest Warrant for Sudan’s Leader, 
supra note 173. 
 177. See Health Fears as Sudan Expels NGOs, ALJAZEERA (Mar. 5, 2009), 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2009/03/200935174114968814.html [hereinafter 
Health Fears]; Sudan Vows to Expel Foreign NGOs from Darfur, supra note 171. 
Among the international NGOs expelled were: Oxfam, Doctors Without Borders (Dutch 
and French branches), CARE, Mercy Corps, Save the Children, the Norweigan Refugee 
Council, the International Rescue Committee, Action Contre la Faim, Solidarites, CHF 
International, the Khartoum Centre for Human Rights, Development and Environment, 
and Amal Centre for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence. See MacFarquhar & Simons, 
Bashir Defies War Crime Arrest Order, supra note 175 (explaining that the affected aid 
agencies represent about 40% of the 6,500 international and local aid workers in Darfur); 
Sudan Vows to Expel Foreign NGOs from Darfur, supra note 171; Sudan Expels Aid 
Groups in Response to Warrant, MSNBC.COM (Mar. 4, 2009), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29492637/ns/world_news-africa/t/sudan-expels-aid-
groups-response-warrant/#.TpILVHLLKCM. 
 178. See, e.g., Sudan Expels NGOs, supra note 175; Health Fears, supra note 177. 
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The expulsions were plainly retaliatory, as one aid official stated, “[i]t 
happened right after the announcement . . . . [t]he connection was 
clear.”179 
Although the Sudanese government’s expulsion of the NGOs was 
strongly condemned,180 the decision was not reconsidered. The Sudanese 
government promised to cover the work of the expelled NGOs,181 but the 
void left by the absence of extensive charitable aid operations re-
mained.182 According to reports, the NGO “expulsions reduced the ac-
cess of 1.5 million persons to healthcare; 1.16 million to water, sanita-
tion, and hygiene; and 1.1 million to food aid.”183 The United Nations 
warned, “[i]t is not possible, in any reasonable timeframe, to replace the 
capacity and expertise these [NGOs] have provided over an extended 
period of time.”184 
                                                                                                             
 179. Simons & MacFarquhar, Court Issues Arrest Warrant for Sudan’s Leader, supra 
note 173 (quoting a charity official). 
 180. Urging the government to urgently reconsider its decision to shut down aid 
groups, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon stated that the decision would 
cause “irrevocable damage” to humanitarian efforts in Sudan if not reversed. Health 
Fears, supra note 177. Similarly, the United States and other countries urged Sudan to 
reconsider its expulsion decision. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Obama Urges Sudan to Allow 
Aid Groups Back Into the Country, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2009, at A12; Neil MacFar-
quhar, U.N. Official Says Darfur Continues to Crumble, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2009, at 
A8 [hereinafter MacFarquhar, U.N. Official Says Darfur Continues to Crumble] (all fif-
teen members of the United Nations Security Council expressed concern about the fate of 
affected Darfur civilians, and “[e]ven friends and neighbors of Sudan, like China, Uganda 
and Libya, which support a deferral of the court’s indictment, expressed concern about 
the impact of the expulsions.”). 
 181. Government spokesman Kamal Ibaid claimed that “[w]hat had been provided by 
those organisations to people in Darfur could simply be provided by national organisa-
tions.” Sudan: NGO Expulsion to Hit Darfur’s Displaced, IRIN NEWS (Mar. 9, 2009), 
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=83370 [hereinafter Sudan: NGO Expul-
sion] (referring to expelled NGOs). 
 182. See, e.g., Neil MacFarquhar, U.N. Official Calls Darfur Aid Tenuous, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 25, 2009, at A12 (explaining how stopgap measures by United Nations agencies 
kept aid flowing to Darfur but described them as “Band-Aid solutions, not long-term 
solutions”); MacFarquhar, U.N. Official Says Darfur Continues to Crumble, supra note 
180 (describing continuing deterioration of humanitarian situation in Darfur in wake of 
Sudanese “government’s decision to expel major foreign aid organizations from the 
country”). 
 183. 2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: SUDAN, supra note 170. Mercy Corps President 
Nancy Lindborg stated that the Sudanese government’s decision was “a devastating blow 
to the many people of Sudan who rely upon NGOs for both immediate survival, and help 
in building more prosperous and stable futures for their families.” Sudan Expels NGOs,  
supra note 175. 
 184. Sudan: NGO Expulsion, supra note 181. 
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The above demonstrates that NGOs—especially the active internation-
al humanitarian organizations—and critiques against them are used as a 
political tool. Although Sudan’s actions were clearly retaliatory in na-
ture, the expulsion of international NGOs represents an extreme form of 
government attack on the sector grounded, at least ostensibly, in NGO 
accountability and legitimacy concerns. 
2. Control of NGO Activities 
The Egyptian government, prior to the Arab Spring, was widely con-
sidered an opponent of human rights and liberal democracy in the Middle 
East. In its annual report rating countries from one (“most free”) to seven 
(“least free”), Freedom House International gave Egypt a political rights 
score of six, a civil liberties score of five, and an overall rating of “not 
free” for 2010.185 Although Egypt boasts one of the largest NGO com-
munities in the Southern global community186—including the rest of the 
Arab world—Egyptian civil society has faced increasingly strict gov-
ernment regulation.187 Egypt adopted anti-NGO laws limiting the free-
dom and ability of NGOs to operate in the country. 
The “Egyptian government [first] . . . entertain[ed] the idea of a law 
[regulating] NGOs” in 1999, when it purported to invite civil society or-
                                                                                                             
 185. Freedom in the World 2010—Egypt,  FREEDOM HOUSE (May 2010), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c0ceaf5c.html. The Freedom in the World survey 
provides an annual evaluation of the state of global freedom as experienced by individu-
als. The ratings process is based on a checklist of ten political rights questions and fifteen 
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2012/methodology (last visited Feb. 5, 2012). 
 186. In 1997, Egypt had 14,000–15,000 private non-profit organizations, in addition to 
many more youth clubs, professional syndicates, and trade unions. See Robert J. La-
Towsky, Egypt’s NGO Sector: A Briefing Paper 1, 6 (Educ. for Dev. Occasional Papers 
Ser. 1, No. 4, 1997), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED412412.pdf. However, 
approximately 25% of the NGOs then registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs were 
inactive. Id. at 10; see also James G. McGann, Pushback Against NGOs in Egypt, INT’L J. 
NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., Aug. 2008, at 29, 32–34. 
 187. See McGann, supra note 186, at 31 (“[A]lthough Egyptian society shows many 
cultural indicators of philanthropy and is demonstrably committed to the founding of 
NGOs, official registration, long-term development, and the growth of NGOs is signifi-
cantly limited under current political conditions.”). 
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ganizations to discuss a draft of a new law, Law No. 153 (“Law 153”).188 
However, the government solely crafted the draft of the law, which was 
sent to Parliament for approval “without [any] direct consultation [with] 
civil society [organizations].”189 Once approved, the law received wide-
spread criticism190 and was ultimately repealed on procedural grounds in 
2000 by the Supreme Constitutional Court.191 “Though repealed, this law 
laid the groundwork for [its sucessor] Law 84/2002” (“Law 84”).192 
Similar in content to Law 153, Law 84 was quietly issued and quickly 
passed by both houses of Parliament in 2002, again with no consultation 
from civil society organizations.193 Generally broad in scope, the law 
provides the Egyptian government with substantial control over NGO 
operations.194 The law grants the government an extraordinary amount of 
“power and discretion to grant or deny registration to an NGO, [to] inter-
fere in the operations and fundraising of an [NGO], and to order [an in-
voluntary] dissolution.”195 
Law 84 imposes strict registration requirements, creating substantial 
obstacles for NGOs from their inception.196 The state regulatory authority 
has the ability to reject NGO applications under Article 11 of the law, 
which vaguely outlines prohibited NGO activities.197 Most notably, Arti-
cle 11 permits rejecting an application based on governmental determina-
                                                                                                             
 188. Id. at 35; see Mohamed Agati, Undermining Standards of Good Governance: 
Egypt’s NGO Laws and Its Impact on the Transparency and Accountability of CSOs, 
INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., Apr. 2007, at 56, 60. 
 189. McGann, supra note 186, at 35; see Agati, supra note 188, at 60. 
 190. See Defending Civil Society, INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., Apr. 2008, at 30, 65 
(describing how the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
expressed “deep concern” with Law No. 153 of 1999). 
 191. See Agati, supra note 188, at 60; McGann, supra note 186, at 35. 
 192. McGann, supra note 186, at 35. 
 193. See Agati, supra note 188, at 61 (“Law No. 84 did not emerge from a dialogue 
between the government and society. Rather, it is seen as a tool for the governing elite to 
control CSOs [civil society organizations].”) (emphasis added); see also McGann, supra 
note 186, at 35 (noting that Law 84 was “quietly passed”). 
 194. See McGann, supra note 186, at 35; see also Agati, supra note 188, at 62–63 
(discussing the legal analysis of Law No. 84). 
 195. Agati, supra note 188, at 63; see also McGann, supra note 186, at 35 (“Law 84 
allows the government to undermine efforts of the political opposition by regulating out 
of existence NGOs that question state authority, through regulations during the registra-
tion stage, the ability to deny the legal foundations of an NGO, and the power to refuse 
access to procured funding.”). 
 196. See Gleason & Mitchell, supra note 164, at 276 (explaining that “only seven of 
thirty organizations successfully navigated [through] the country’s NGO registration 
requirements” in 2005). 
 197. See Egypt: Margins of Repression, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 3, 2005), 
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/11675/section/7 [hereinafter Egypt: Margins of Repression]. 
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tion that the organization “threaten[s] national unity or [violates] public 
order or morals.”198 Rejections can also be based on disapproval of an 
organization’s founding members or on any provisions of an associa-
tion’s articles of incorporation determined to violate the law.199 The law 
is regularly used as a tool to ban organizations whose behavior or goals 
are not favored by the state.200 
Even if successful in overcoming the challenges of registration, NGOs 
face obtrusive oversight of their activities, “with the threat of dissolution 
always looming in the background.”201 Law 84 permits the state to send 
representatives to an organization’s meetings and to call meetings of the 
organization’s general assembly.202 Moreover, NGOs must provide the 
government with minutes within thirty days of each meeting.203 The law 
grants the state extraordinary power to regulate the composition of indi-
vidual NGO boards.204 
Law 84 also provides the Egyptian government with a means of con-
trol over the funding of NGOs. Under Article 17, an NGO may not ac-
cept foreign funding without explicit authorization from the state.205 Alt-
hough the law provides that the state regulatory authority must give its 
final decision within sixty days, because NGOs are not permitted to ac-
                                                                                                             
 198. McGann, supra note 186, at 36 (“At least five human rights NGOs had been de-
nied registration as of June 2005 due to ‘security concerns’ or other Article 11 considera-
tions.”) (citation omitted); see also Justin Shore, Ctr. for Human Rights & Humanitarian 
Law, Human Rights Council Periodic Review Prompts Egypt to Promise NGO Reform, 
HUM. RTS. BRIEF (Mar. 24, 2010), http://hrbrief.org/2010/03/human-rights-council-
universal-periodic-review-prompts-egypt-to-promise-ngo-reform/ (noting that Law 84 
allows Egyptian government to “dissolve NGOs or imprison workers for any political 
activity or threat to ‘national unity.’”). 
 199. See McGann, supra note 186, at 35; see also Agati, supra note 188, at 63. 
 200. See Egypt: Margins of Repression, supra note 197; McGann, supra note 186, at 
36. 
 201. McGann, supra note 186, at 36. 
 202. See Agati, supra note 188, at 64; McGann, supra note 186, at 36. 
 203. See McGann, supra note 186, at 36. 
 204. Specifically, Law 84 requires NGOs to submit nominated board members for pre-
approval by the state regulatory authority sixty days prior to board elections. See Egypt: 
Margins of Repression, supra note 197. Board nominees can be removed by the state 
regulatory authority for “non-fulfillment of nomination requirements.” McGann, supra 
note 186, at 36 (citation omitted); see also Agati, supra note 188, at 64 (“The board of 
directors must provide a list of board nominees to the Ministry of Social Affairs within a 
day of their nomination.”). 
 205. See Mohamed ElAgati, Egypt, INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., May 2010, at 9, 10; 
see also Agati, supra note 188, at 65 (“This provision undermines the sustainability of 
many organizations. Foreign funding is the most essential financial source for civil hu-
man rights and development associations, especially because financing from Egypt’s 
private sector for such organizations does not exist.”). 
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cess any of the funds during the waiting period, that period can drive 
NGOs into insolvency.206 Additionally, NGOs must provide state offi-
cials with detailed accounting reports of expenses and revenues, includ-
ing the sources of donations.207 
Violations of Law 84 can result in criminal penalties, including fines or 
imprisonment, or even in dissolution of the NGO.208 However, because 
activities prohibited in Article 11 are so vaguely defined, the government 
has great discretion in determining whether a violation has occurred.209 
As a result, many NGOs become “subject to penalty without being clear-
ly forewarned of their illegal activity.”210 
Egypt’s Law 84 illustrates a second strategy that governments have 
used to curb nonprofit influence. By involving the government directly in 
the efforts of nongovernmental organizations, the government may sys-
tematically interfere in an NGO’s associational and advocacy activities 
as a method of state control. 
Even after the Arab Spring and the removal of President Hosni Mubar-
ak earlier in February 2011, Egyptian security forces have raided, har-
assed, and otherwise inhibited NGOs.211 Recent media reports describe 
coordinated raids by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces on ten to 
seventeen organizations that closed offices and detained staff.212 The re-
ports indicate that the military officers “provided no warrants or explana-
tions” but state news media indicated the focus was on “illegal foreign 
funding.”213 The military rulers have taken inconsistent positions both 
pledging to halt such raids214 and vigorously defending the crack-
                                                                                                             
 206. One local NGO official noted: “The sixty days are an issue—of course the gov-
ernment will take longer, and we won’t be able to touch it. Our operational funding is 
vital. It is essential we get it in time, and it’s the hardest to find. The electricity [bill] must 
be paid.” Egypt: Margins of Repression, supra note 197; see also McGann, supra note 
186, at 37 (“Many organizations that had experienced trouble with registration find that 
gaining permission to use their foreign-donated funds can be equally trying.”). 
 207. See Agati, supra note 188, at 65. 
 208. See id. at 65; McGann, supra note 186, at 37. 
 209. See Agati, supra note 188, at 65 (“For example, activities are prohibited if they 
are deemed to threaten national unity or violate the public order or morals. All political 
activities are prohibited as well.”) (emphasis in original). 
 210. See McGann, supra note 186, at 37. 
 211. See Rebecca Collard & Dan Murphy, US “Deeply Concerned” After Egypt Raids 
NGO Offices, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 29, 2011, at 1. 
 212. See id. 
 213. David D. Kirkpatrick & Steven Lee Myers, Egyptian Forces Raid and Shut Civic 
Groups, Drawing Sharp U.S. Response, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2011, at A4. 
 214. See Steven Lee Myers & David D. Kirkpatrick, After International Outcry, Egypt 
Vows to End Crackdown on Nonprofits, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2011, at A4. 
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downs.215 Accordingly, “a tremor of fear” has been sent through the net-
work of civil society organizations.216 
3. Bureaucratic Barriers 
Russia has an active civil society with more than 220,000 noncommer-
cial organizations and public associations.217 However, the NGOs operate 
under conditions of significant government regulation, particularly the 
enactment of the January 2006 Russian Federation Law, On Introducing 
Amendments into Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation 
(“2006 Russian NGO Law”), under then-President Vladimir Putin’s ad-
ministration.218 The law aimed “to regulate the activities of non-
governmental and non-commercial organizations operating in the Rus-
sian Federation and . . . [introduced] new registration procedures and 
stricter monitoring of NGO activities, financial contributions, and budg-
ets.”219 In addition to significantly expanding government control over 
NGOs, the law “considerably restrict[ed] the right to association and 
right to privacy of NGOs and NGO members.”220 
                                                                                                             
 215. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Undercutting Vow of Softer Stance, Egypt Again De-
fends Office Raids, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2012, at A7. 
 216. Id. 
 217. NGO Law Monitor: Russia, INT’L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW [ICNL], 
http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/russia.pdf (last updated Nov. 16, 2011) [hereinafter 
NGO Law Monitor: Russia]. 
 218. See Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Introducing Amendments into 
Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation, SABRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA 
ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Collection of Legislation] 2006, No. 18-FZ, 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/44363d654.html. 
 219. Michael P. Maxwell, Comment, NGOs in Russia: Is the Recent Russian NGO 
Legislation the End of Civil Society in Russia?, 15 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 235, 236 
(2006) (quoting Igor Khrestin, New NGO Law in Russia: The Implementation Matters 
More Than Substance, AM. ENTER. INST. (Feb. 28, 2006), 
http://www.aei.org/article/23965). 
 220. Alison Kamhi, The Russian NGO Law: Potential Conflicts with International, 
National, and Foreign Legislation, 9 INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 34, 34 (2006) (describ-
ing review of the draft of the law by the Council of Europe, which declared many of the 
law’s provisions as “problematic”); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Choking on Bu-
reaucracy 2 (Feb. 2008) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Choking on Bureaucracy], 
available at http://www.hrw.org/en/node/62400/section/1: 
[I]n order to be compatible with protections under international law for free-
dom of expression and association, these restrictions must be proportionate, 
necessary for a democratic society, and must pursue a legitimate aim. The re-
strictions must also be sufficiently clear so that those subject to them can rea-
sonably know how to comply . . . . The restrictions in the 2006 law do not meet 
these tests. 
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However, this law is contested by civil society activists. Many critics 
have noted that the law was partly aimed at foreign NGOs operating in 
Russia, which are perceived as soft power tools advancing Western in-
terests to promote regime changes in Russia and its neighbors.221 In par-
ticular, with elections approaching, government leaders were cognizant 
of the perception that international NGOs played a key role in stoking the 
2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia and the similar Orange Revolution in 
Ukraine a year later.222 
The law imposed onerous and stringent registration and reporting re-
quirements on NGOs—especially with respect to foreign sources of 
funding—with severe penalties for noncompliance.223 For example, the 
law required organizations to fill out approximately one hundred pages 
of documents, listing detailed personal information about each founder 
and each member.224 A single mistake or misstep in the paperwork could 
serve as “grounds for denial of registration, essentially providing the 
government with another excuse to dissolve—or refuse to recognize le-
                                                                                                             
(emphasis added). “The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) 
reported that actions and statements by Russian officials ‘indicate a declining level of 
tolerance for unfettered NGO activity, particularly for those NGOs receiving foreign 
funding.’” Robert C. Blitt, “Babushka Said Two Things—It Will Either Rain or Snow; It 
Either Will or Will Not”: An Analysis of the Provisions and Human Rights Implications 
of Russia’s New Law on Non-Governmental Organizations As Told Through Eleven Rus-
sian Proverbs, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L. L. REV. 1, 5 (2008) (quoting U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, Challenge to Civil Society: Russia’s Amended Law on Noncom-
mercial Organizations 6 (2007), available at 
http://www.uscirf.gov/images/stories/pdf/russia_ngo_report_final_march5.pdf). 
 221. See Maxwell, supra note 219, at 237 (“[T]he new law [the 2006 Russian NGO 
Law] comes in the wake of several recent events that seem to indicate this is just another 
example of President Putin attempting to gain effective control over the entire political 
system.”); see also Gregory L. White, West Hits a Wall With Putin—Despite Rising 
Doubts, Leaders Are Reluctant to Alienate Moscow, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2006, at A11 
(noting the law was “publicly criticized by a number of Western officials.”). 
 222. See Rebecca B. Vernon, Closing the Door on Aid, 11 INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 
5, 11 (2009); see also George Melloan, Putin’s KGB Instincts Serve Russia Badly, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 14, 2006, at A23. 
 223. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Choking on Bureaucracy, supra note 220, at 2. The 
law “gives the [government] unlimited discretion to request documents for inspection and 
[interpretation] . . . including for compliance with the constitution, laws, and ‘interests’ of 
Russia in the broadest terms. In several cases, Human Rights Watch found that Russian 
government officials had made burdensome requests for documents, including [requests] 
for confidential records and communications with clients.” Id.; see also Gleason & 
Mitchell, supra note 164, at 275 (describing how Russia’s NGO law imposes burdensome 
registration requirements that “substantially infringe on the right of association.”). 
 224. See Kamhi, supra note 220, at 35. In addition, “[i]f any of the founders are de-
ceased, the organization must provide death certifications.” Id. 
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gally—organizations.”225 For several months, Human Rights Watch, 
Amnesty International, the Danish Refugee Council, two branches of 
Doctors Without Borders, and other major international NGOs were 
temporarily forced to stop their activities for allegedly failing to comply 
with the law and its registration requirements.226 
The 2006 Russian NGO Law also restricts the formation of, participa-
tion, and membership in an NGO to individuals domiciled in Russia, 
thereby prohibiting foreign nationals or stateless persons or entities from 
effective organization.227 All foreign NGOs operating in Russia must 
inform the government about their projects for the upcoming year and 
the approximate amount of money allocated to each project; the govern-
ment then has the discretion to ban projects (or even parts of projects) on 
vague basis.228 Moreover, the law also authorizes state officials to con-
duct intrusive annual inspections of NGOs.229 
The election of President Dmitry Medvedev in 2008 fueled hope that 
the legal framework regulating civil society in Russia might liberalize.230 
                                                                                                             
 225. Id. 
As of June 29, 2006, forty foreign NGOs had applied for official registration 
under the [2006 Russian NGO Law]—and not a single one was successful . . . . 
The fact that all forty were denied registration indicates how complicated the 
new requirements are and confirms NGOs’ fears that this law can be used to 
harass NGOs, creating unnecessary work for them and excuses for the govern-
ment to deny organizations registration. 
Id.; see also Anastasia Kornya, Non-Governmental Organizations Fail the Test, 
VEDOMOSTI (June 29, 2006), reprinted in NAT’L CONF. ON SOVIET JEWRY WKLY. NEWS 
BRIEF, June 30, 2006, at 9 (A. Ignatkin trans.), available at 
www.ncsj.org/AuxPages/Wkly060630.pdf (noting that “forty foreign non-governmental 
organizations have tried to obtain official registration in Russia since the new legislation” 
and “[n]ot one of them has been successful”). 
 226. Kamhi, supra note 220, at 35; see also Politics & Economics: Russia Eases 
Stance Toward Foreign NGOs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2006, at A6 (noting that foreign 
governmental organizations were “forced to suspend operations” in Russia); Charles 
Digges, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Others Temporarily Halted by 
Russian NGO Law, BELLONA (Oct. 19, 2006), 
http://www.bellona.org/articles/articles_2006/Rejected_NGOs. 
 227. Kamhi, supra note 220, at 37. 
 228. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Choking on Bureaucracy, supra note 220, at 3. 
 229. See id. at 2. 
 230. See, e.g., Nikolaus von Twickel, Kremlin Takes Small Step to Ease NGO Law, 
MOSCOW TIMES (May 28, 2009), http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2009-99-17.cfm 
(“Russia’s stifling NGO law has been labeled a hallmark of former President Vladimir 
Putin’s heavy-handed approach to civil liberties. Likewise, President Dmitry Medvedev’s 
recent promise to review the law has been praised as a sign of his liberalism.”); Peter 
Finn, Putin’s Chosen Successor, Medvedev, Elected in Russia—Power-Sharing is Main 
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In the spring of 2009, after meeting with NGO leaders and hearing their 
complaints, President Medvedev promised to review Russia’s NGO law, 
stating that “improvements to NGO legislation were possible and also 
necessary.”231 By June 2009, the Russian Duma amended the 2006 NGO 
law, attempting to “liberalise the legal position of NGOs”232 and “bring 
the restrictive law . . . into line with Russia’s international human rights 
obligations.”233 Drafted by a presidential working group including repre-
sentatives of the administration, the Justice Ministry, the Russian Duma, 
the Federation Council, and civil society organizations,234 the amend-
ments eased the previously stringent registration requirements for 
NGOs.235 Under the amendments, incomplete or incorrect registrations 
and re-registrations of NGOs no longer result in automatic denials of reg-
                                                                                                             
Focus After a Crushing Win, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2008, at A11 (describing the ability of 
Medvedev to “chart a new course for Russia,” including “increasing personal freedoms . . 
. and a less confrontational stance abroad”). The hope for improvement in Russia’s civil 
society continues to increase, as 2011 is a pre-election year in Russia. See Mikhail Gor-
bachev, Op-Ed, President Medvedev, Russia Needs a New Agenda, INT’L HERALD TRIB., 
Dec. 13, 2010, at 8 (promoting the argument that President Medvedev has the ability to 
shape the new agenda for Russia, which includes consideration of the movement in which 
grassroots organizing is becoming deeper and stronger in Russian society—a movement 
which civil society groups are at the forefront). 
 231. Eberhard Schneider, Russian Domestic Policy, EU-RUSSIA CENTRE WEEKLY 
COLUMN (EU-Russ. Ctr., Brussels, Belg.) (July 20, 2009), available at http://www.eu-
russiacentre.org/our-publications/column/russian-domestic-policy.html; see also Russia: 
Revise NGO Law to Protect Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 13, 2009), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/05/13/russia-revise-ngo-law-protect-rights (“Medvedev 
acknowledged the difficulties faced by NGOs, including restrictions ‘without sufficient 
justification,’ and the fact that many government officials view NGOs as a threat.”); 
Charles Digges, Medvedev Suggests Amendments to Russia’s NGO Law—Human Rights 
Activists Suggest More, BELLONA (June 18, 2009), 
http://www.bellona.org/articles/articles_2009/medvedev_ngo_amendments (noting that 
“Medvedev proposed . . . amendments relaxing laws on NGOs.”); von Twickel, supra 
note 230 (noting “Medvedev promised to enact changes . . . .”). 
 232. Schneider, supra note 231 (paraphrasing Garri Minch, President Medvedev’s 
respresentative in the Duma). The Russian Duma adopted amendments to Russian Feder-
al Law No. 7-FZ of January 12, 1996, “On Non-Commercial Organizations,” which came 
into force on August 1, 2009. See id. 
 233. Russia: Revise NGO Law to Protect Rights, supra note 231. “Human Rights 
Watch, the Moscow Helsinki Group, AGORA, the Youth Human Rights Movement, and 
the Human Rights Resource Center [all] submitted a list of proposed reforms for [Rus-
sia’s] NGO law to the Ministry of Justice in April [2009] and to the Presidential Council 
for Civil Society Organizations and Human Rights in early May [2009].” Id. 
 234. See von Twickel, supra note 230. 
 235. See Clifford J. Levy, Russia: Fewer Hurdles for Nonprofit Organizations, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 17, 2009, at A8 (explaining the new legislation as “eas[ing] some of the 
regulatory burdens on nonprofit groups.”). 
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istration; rather, the registration process “may be suspended for up to 
three months until the applicant completes or corrects the application.”236 
Furthermore, mandatory government audits of NGOs will occur every 
three years as opposed to annually.237 In addition, the provision allowing 
the government to refuse to register NGOs when the organization is 
deemed to threaten Russia’s “unique character, cultural heritage, or na-
tional interests of the Russian federation” was removed.238 
Thus, while the amended version of Russia’s NGO law is less draconi-
an than the law was under the Putin administration, the Russian govern-
ment’s aggressive approach to regulating NGOs demonstrates significant 
hostility toward civil society, particularly toward those NGOs perceived 
to be closely associated with foreign support, expertise, or influence. 
4. Co-optation 
Civil society organizations have enjoyed a long tradition in Venezuela. 
The 1999 Venezuelan Constitution purports to “seek to promote and pro-
tect human rights and citizens’ right to participate as the foundation of 
democratic coexistence and social peace.” 239 However, recently the Ven-
ezuelan government has imposed restrictive laws and practices aimed at 
NGOs.240 
                                                                                                             
 236. See NGO Law Monitor: Russia, supra note 217; see also von Twickel, supra note 
230. 
 237. See NGO Law Monitor: Russia, supra note 217. 
 238. See id. 
 239. NGO Law Monitor: Venezuela, INT’L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW, 
http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/venezuela.pdf (last updated Dec. 31, 2011). 
 240. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR”) report, Democra-
cy and Human Rights in Venezuela, describes a series of state actions and statements by 
high-ranking public officials aimed at undermining the legitimacy of domestic and inter-
national human rights NGOs in Venezuela. The report identifies a trend of opening un-
founded judicial investigations or criminal proceedings against human rights defenders in 
order to intimidate them, particularly when they have been critical of the Venezuelan 
government. The report also describes cases where judicial proceedings have been 
brought against NGOs and human rights defenders for alleged offenses such as, inter 
alia, conspiracy to destroy the republican form of government, criminal association, and 
defamation. Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep., Democracy and Human Rights 
in Venezuela, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 54 (Dec. 30, 2009), available at 
http://cidh.org/pdf%20files/VENEZUELA%202009%20ENG.pdf; see also 2009 HUMAN 
RIGHTS REPORT: VENEZUELA, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 11, 2010), available at 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/wha/136130.htm (describing how a variety of 
independent domestic and international human rights groups operated with some gov-
ernment restrictions and how many domestic NGOs reported threats, physical attacks, 
and harassment). 
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In December 2010, Venezuela enacted the Law for Protection of Polit-
ical Liberty and National Self-determination. The law specifically targets 
NGOs dedicated to the “defense of political rights” or other “political 
objectives.”241 Moreover, the law precludes such organizations from 
holding assets or receiving financial support from foreign sources.242 In 
addition, government officials continue to debate that the draft Ley de 
Cooperación Internacional (“Law on International Cooperation”)243 
threatens the “continued existence and independence of NGOs,” as well 
as drastically infringes upon the right of freedom of association.244 The 
proposed Law on International Cooperation, which was approved on its 
first reading,245 gives the Venezuelan government unprecedented authori-
ty to control, organize, and direct all “activities of international coopera-
tion,” including, transfers of resources and skills.246 The legislature has 
not yet taken further action needed to enact the Law on International Co-
operation despite calls by government officials to do so.247 
Most significantly, the law requires all foreign funds to be routed 
through a government-administered Fund for International Cooperation 
and Assistance, which would place substantial discretion and control in 
the government with regard to which NGOs receive funds and re-
sources.248 Effectively, the fund would create a new level of dependency 
between NGOs and the Venezuelan government, and the government 
                                                                                                             
 241. See NGO Law Monitor: Venezuela, supra note 239. 
 242. See Int’l Ctr. for Not-for-Profit Law, Wave of Constraint: Recent Developments 
in Venezuela, Ecuador, Honduras, Iran, Bahrain, and Cambodia 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.icnl.org/research/trends/trends2-2.pdf. 
 243. See Alexandra Freitas, Commentary Regarding Venezuela’s Proposed Law on 
International Cooperation, ACCESS INITIATIVE BLOG (July 22, 2009), 
http://www.accessinitiative.org/blog/2009/07/commentary-regarding-venezuela´s-
proposed-law-international-cooperation. 
 244. Freitas, supra note 243. 
 245. See NGO Law Monitor: Venezuela, supra note 239. 
 246. See Venezuela’s NGOs Fear New Law Will Stifle Civil Society, Curb Freedom of 
Expression, DEMOCRACY DIGEST BLOG (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.demdigest.net/ 
blog/2010/12/venezuelas-ngos-fear-new-law-will-stifle-civil-society-curb-freedom-of-
expression/. 
 247. See NGO Law Monitor: Venezuela, supra note 239. 
 248. See generally Marcos Carrillo, Venezuela, 12 INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 41 
(2010) (discussing the law’s prohibitions against foreign funding and routing funding 
through the government); see also Freitas, supra note 243; Christopher Toothaker, NGOs 
Warn of Restrictions in Pending Venezuela Law, GUARDIAN (U.K.) (May 7, 2009), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8495746 (noting that the new Venezuela 
law would direct foreign funds into “a government-controlled fund”). 
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would have the power to stifle or starve the activities of NGOs not 
aligned with its interests.249 
Many experts believe it is very likely that the draft Law on Internation-
al Cooperation will be approved in the near future.250 This should be par-
ticularly worrisome to the nonprofit sector because Venezuela’s pro-
posed international cooperation law has influenced other Latin America 
countries, such as Bolivia, Peru, and Mexico, to propose similar laws.251 
This type of bill demonstrates that NGOs and particularly foreign fund-
ing have become lightning rods.252 By controlling or limiting access to 
financial support, governments are attempting to discipline—through the 
regulation of NGOs—civil society into falling in line. 
III. LESSONS FOR THE PHILANTHROPIC COMMUNITY 
This Article raises some fundamental questions about anti-NGO 
thought, activism, and policies. Beyond a review of the damning cri-
tiques of NGOs leveled by others, this Article considers the varieties of 
resistance and where they may lead. Are there lessons to be learned from 
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foreign funding to be channeled via a government fund. See NGO Law Monitor: Vene-
zuela, supra note 239. The Venezuelan government has previously accused the United 
States and other countries of illegally funding NGOs, charities, and businesses in Vene-
zuela as part of a “dirty campaign” to remove Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez from 
office. Id. Chávez accused the United States of “playing a role in a failed 2002 coup,” an 
accusation that the U.S. has consistently denied. See Dan Molinski, In Venezuela, Accu-
sations Against Ronald McDonald House, Among Other U.S. Charities, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 25, 2010, at A12 (describing how the Chávez government filed complaints against 
“many Venezuelan NGOs as well as local chapters of international organizations,” such 
as the Ronald McDonald House Charities). 
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these critiques? Can or should individuals and institutions aligned with or 
supportive of NGOs do more to support them and better position them 
against such attacks? This Article suggests that serious consideration of 
anti-NGO arguments and criticisms should lead to critical reevaluations 
of the power dynamics between Northern funders and Southern NGO 
grant recipients. In particular, I argue that there may be an inverse rela-
tionship between efforts to increase the accountability of Northern non-
profit funders and the legitimacy of Southern NGOs receiving support 
from Western nonprofit organizations. 
A. Accountability 
Accountability is at the center of nonprofit discourse today. The notion 
that nonprofits need to improve their levels of accountability is conven-
tional wisdom among students of civil society and philanthropy. As used 
by a variety of critics and scholars of NGOs, “accountability” appears to 
have several different meanings, some of which are inconsistent. These 
inconsistencies or contradictions remain unnoticed, are not regularly dis-
cussed, and create conceptual confusion. Notably, skeptics of NGOs on 
the right, critics of nonprofits from the left, and governments seeking to 
discredit the work of NGOs all use the trope of “accountability” as a 
sword to attack nonprofit organizations. The ambiguity surrounding the 
meaning of the term raises questions—rather than sheds light—on the 
role of NGOs in civil society. 
The accountability concerns of anti-NGO activists are frequently pre-
sented as institutional, efficient, and apolitical critiques of nonprofit be-
havior. But accountability has several different meanings and uses. It can 
refer to financial accountability (i.e., the ability of an organization to ef-
fectively safeguard and manage its financial resources), organizational 
accountability (i.e., emphasizing the internal governance of nonprofit 
organizations and their use of legitimate and transparent processes), mis-
sion accountability (i.e., the ability to effectively carry out activities to 
advance the primary purposes or mission of the organization), upward 
stakeholder accountability (i.e., responsiveness to key individual, corpo-
rate, private foundation, and/or government donors that provide essential 
funding to finance ongoing operations), and downward stakeholder ac-
countability (i.e., responsiveness to the beneficiaries or constituents 
served by the organization).253 Other important measures of and proce-
dures to achieve accountability also exist.254 
                                                                                                             
 253. See generally Evelyn Brody, Accountability and the Public Trust, in THE STATE 
OF NONPROFIT AMERICA 471, 475–76 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002) (explaining that 
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Due to the complexity and multiple uses of accountability, it is not al-
ways clear what criticisms of NGOs cloaked in accountability mean. 
This assortment of varying conceptions of accountability limits the 
term’s utility. In some cases, accountability means so many different 
things that the term may not actually mean much of anything at all. 
As noted earlier, accountability in the corporate and public sectors is 
often conceived of in strict, formal terms.255 In the corporate model, ac-
countability usually focuses on ownership lines and emphasizes direct 
relationships between owners/shareholders (the principals) and the direc-
tors they elect and officers they appoint (their agents). Similarly, in the 
public context, accountability is established through the ballot box when 
voters consider discrete issues or elect agents, thereby tethering govern-
ment to individuals. Although quite limited in their own ways, these par-
ticular lines of accountability do share the virtue of being clear. Of 
course in practice, we may question whether deeply accountable relation-
ships genuinely exist in the corporate and public sectors. 
Regardless, the application of a singular primary principal model of 
accountability used in the business and government sectors, however, is 
inapplicable in the nonprofit context. Rather than relying on direct for-
mal ties, nonprofit accountability in an abstract sense256 is, to borrow the 
phrase of Mary Kay Gugerty and Aseem Prakash, a narrative process.257 
Thus this creates what I term “thin” and “thick” conceptions of account-
ability: the former being clear, formal, and objective but limited in scope, 
and the latter being indirect, capacious, and subjective in an effort to be 
comprehensive and inclusive. 
                                                                                                             
direction and mission, and effectiveness and public trust); James J. Fishman, The Non-
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 254. For example, voluntary membership in associations (that may carry prestige or 
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See generally VOLUNTARY REGULATION OF NGOS AND NONPROFITS: AN 
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 255. See supra text accompanying note 10. 
 256. However, some of the more specialized treatments of accountability, e.g., finan-
cial accountability, are more amenable to a thin application that can be assigned to a 
clearly identified source. 
 257. Mary Kay Gugerty & Aseem Prakash, Voluntary Regulation of NGOs and Non-
profits: An Introduction to the Club Framework, in VOLUNTARY REGULATION OF NGOS 
AND NONPROFITS: AN ACCOUNTABILITY CLUB FRAMEWORK, supra note 254, at 3, 6. 
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Critics advocate a thin model when they apply ideas of accountability 
familiar in public contexts, such as voting, or private contexts, such as 
shareholder meetings, to NGOs. This model presumes clearly identifiable 
stakeholders. Managers of a corporation are accountable to shareholders; 
politicians to voting public—there is no confusion about the source to 
whom one may be accountable. But this model is also formal and limited 
in scope. It is formal because shareholders and voters are given only the 
binary option to accept or reject what is placed before them. It is limited 
in scope because they are asked either to respond to policy matters that 
have already been defined and narrowed or more often only to accept or 
reject the representative herself. 
While sharing in critics’ desire for heightened accountability, I would 
argue that a thick model is more appropriate for NGOs. NGOs, rather 
than answer to one set of clearly identifiable constituents, should strive to 
be far more capacious and inclusive. They should look to multiple audi-
ences—upward to donors of different types and downward to a range of 
beneficiaries to judge them on performance. Likewise, rather than offer 
stakeholders only formal binary options to respond to limited prefabri-
cated choices, NGOs instead should strive to be substantive and compre-
hensive—that is, NGO accountability should include genuine efforts to 
engage constituent stakeholders in broad-ranging substantive discussion 
and dialogue to formulate policy choices themselves. 
Indeed, a thick nonprofit accountability model is far more difficult to 
implement and much harder to measure than a thin one, but such a model 
supports the values and the goals of the nonprofit sector and is something 
NGOs should aspire to. External and upward accountability approaches 
should be combined with internal and downward accountability to local 
communities to achieve long-term impact on social ills.258 Genuine ac-
countability will not be achieved in a thin, top-down model. Real ac-
countability must allow the grass roots to speak up, place marginalized 
people at the center of their own story, authorize individuals to pursue 
the collective common good (as they see and define it), and create room 
for beneficiaries to generate and execute their own transformational vi-
sion.259 
This distinction in accountability perspectives is not just an academic 
one; it also affects policy and substantive choices. I worry that if the 
nonprofit sector were to select a principal subject of accountability, akin 
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 259. Cf. Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?, supra note 85, at 796–99, 
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to the voter or the shareholder, that would likely be donors. Of course, 
donors are already important nonprofit principals because most nonprof-
its must seek to secure the financial resources necessary to conduct their 
activities. But a donor primacy accountability model would discount oth-
er important constituencies and demographics, most notably charitable 
beneficiaries often made up of relatively powerless or subordinated 
groups and/or communities that are frequently served by nonprofit or-
ganizations. Ironically, the adoption of a thin NGO-funder accountability 
model may strengthen the arguments of critics and further expose the 
nonprofit sector, especially foreign NGOs, to some of the lines of assault 
already being used against them. For instance, critiques focusing on rep-
resentativeness (right), neocolonialism (left), and foreign influence 
(lodged by governments) would only be enhanced. 
Moreover, if donors were to be relied on as the primary means to keep 
nonprofits accountable, many NGO critics still would be dissatisfied. 
Especially to the degree that the largest and most influential donors are 
institutional ones—particularly private foundations with endowments—
many of the same questions could be recycled: to whom then are the 
foundations accountable? Because the very nature of an endowed private 
foundation (which is created to exercise private control and by definition 
lacks the broad-based public support of other charitable organizations)260 
presents its own accountability challenges,261 reliance on NGO-donor 
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system of accountability would seem only to offer a partial solution. 
Those worried that NGOs serve no single defined master may not be sat-
isfied with a principal master being another form of nonprofit entity that 
serves no single defined master. Accordingly, we need a thicker take on 
accountability for the nonprofit sector. 
In reflecting on the nature of the major anti-NGO criticisms described 
in Part II, which often come packaged as accountability concerns, the 
critiques are, at bottom, actually grounded in concerns about NGO power 
and effectiveness and NGO authenticity and voice. I am not particularly 
concerned about the strength of the former criticisms, but I am concerned 
about the latter. 
Generally, I find NGO power relatively less worrisome for three rea-
sons. First, in comparison with other societal segments, nonprofits do not 
seem to have disproportionate power and, if anything, recent increases in 
their numbers262 may prove to be an equalizing trend. Some of the dis-
comfort with NGO power appears to be prompted by broader fears of 
power shifts toward nonprofits due to the policies they might promote, or 
simply a greater sense of comfort with power resting in the hands of pri-
vate interests (individual or corporate) or governments. To the extent that 
anti-NGO sentiments are driven by a sense that NGOs are, in many 
ways, simply too effective, too capable of executing and achieving their 
missions and making an impact, the thicker conception of accountability 
is not undermined. In other words, much of the attack on the “power” of 
NGOs charges that people are listening, NGOs are reaching their target-
ed audiences, and people and institutions with resources are taking 
NGOs and their arguments seriously.263 
Yet many nonprofit scholars would argue that this is exactly what we 
want of nonprofit organizations, that organizational effectiveness is, in-
deed, a form of accountability (i.e., mission accountability). Furthermore, 
international businesses and other financial interests have long attempted 
to influence public policy, so NGOs may simply be offering a counter-
vailing perspective. As other sectors become more globalized and trans-
national, it is understandable that philanthropy too will be transformed, 
with nonprofit and public interest associations widening their geographic 
scope, with new entities emerging with cross-border concerns or interna-
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 262. See supra Part I.B. 
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tional reach at the core of their organizational identity. Accordingly, the-
se power shifts may remedy past disparities in which other non-state ac-
tors, usually representing private financial interests, could operate with-
out effective competition to influence international and transnational pol-
icy matters. 
Second, concerns about NGO power may be somewhat overstated, es-
pecially with respect to local foreign-based NGOs. In her book, Under-
mining Development: The Absence of Power Among Local NGOs in Af-
rica, Sarah Michael addresses this issue.264 She concludes that local 
NGOs active in Africa lack substantial power, which she defines as “the 
ability . . . to set their own priorities, define their own agendas and exert 
their influence on the international development community, even in the 
face of opposition from government, donors, international NGOs and 
other development actors.”265 Although power has many different defini-
tions, the ability to control ends or control others is usually considered an 
essential marker.266 Governments thus have intrinsic power that others, 
such as corporations, individuals, and civil society groups, may only seek 
to manipulate using or reacting to government power.267 Even with re-
spect to large international NGOs, there may be some exaggeration at 
play. Certainly some NGOs are large and influential—but the revenues, 
assets, and annual budgets of the large international nonprofits are con-
siderably smaller than many governments, state-owned oil companies, 
sovereign wealth funds, Fortune 500 companies, and other multinational 
private businesses.268 
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Third, the power NGOs wield is earned soft power. Professor Joseph 
Nye of the Harvard Kennedy School describes power as “the ability to 
get the outcomes you want, and to affect the behavior of others to make 
this happen.”269 He distinguishes between hard power (coercion) and soft 
power (co-optation).270 To the degree that power is regularly exercised 
by NGOs, generally it is soft power at work. Nonprofits lack hard power; 
they cannot force governments to do things through command, force of 
law, significant economic might, or military force. NGOs rely primarily 
on the tools of soft power: co-option, attracting people and institutions to 
their values, and engendering cooperation. Looking at power in these 
terms, lessens the concern about the power of nonprofits because any 
(soft) power that might be used by international, domestic, or local 
NGOs has likely been earned through expertise, credibility, persuasion, 
and effective communication. 
The point is not that nonprofit organizations lack power or that they 
have not misused power in alarming ways. They do and they have. In 
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fact, some of my prior work has been highly critical of certain exercises 
of power in the charitable sector.271 Ultimately, critiques about power 
require elaboration and framing. Rather than bemoaning the power of 
any group (for-profit or nonprofit), a more enlightened conversation 
would focus on how NGO power is manufactured, how it operates on the 
ground, and what are its normative ends. For this Article, reflections on 
the second of those issues,272 particularly the transparency and inclusivity 
of NGO power, has led to conclusions about thick accountability dis-
cussed in this Part and donor control discussed below.273 
B. Rethinking the Exercise of Donor Control 
What remains unsettling in the anti-NGO critiques are the concerns 
expressed about authenticity and voice. Whether the argument comes in 
the form of challenges to claims of representativeness by people on the 
right asking who is really behind those NGOs; or by those on the left 
expressing concern about poor and other marginalized citizens being si-
lenced or ill-represented by professionalized, Northern-dominated 
NGOs, and questioning whether colonial philanthropy serves Southern or 
Northern interests; or by governments that attack or resent the claims of 
some NGOs to speak on behalf of citizens yet appear to be predominant-
ly responsive to foreign donors. Beneath all these criticisms and ques-
tions lies a common set of concerns about the authenticity and voice of 
NGOs. And there may well be something to these criticisms. 
Of particular concern, the controlling approach of Northern funders 
may be a threat to the authenticity and voice of Southern NGOs.274 As I 
have written extensively about elsewhere, the practice of philanthropy 
has undergone a problematic shift toward an assertive, donor-controlled 
approach to grantmaking.275 Increasingly over the past fifteen years or so, 
wealthy philanthropic foundations have focused on responding to legiti-
mate questions and criticisms regarding their own accountability.276 
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Driven in part by a desire to prove that they are strategic and accounta-
ble, foundations have turned to more muscular approaches to philanthro-
py marked by high engagement, heavy intervention in grantee affairs, 
and extensive demands on grantees.277 These practices have all led to a 
pervading sense of donor control over grantee activities.278 This move 
toward a more directive and instrumentalist approach to grantmaking is 
transforming grant recipients into subordinates who answer to their man-
ager’s control or subcontractors who execute the foundation’s vision.279 
Donors also have begun to widely employ metrics, assessment, and 
other business principles more commonly used in the for-profit world.280 
Although measurement can be used effectively in the social sector, many 
are concerned that funders’ overemphasis on metrics is becoming wide-
spread, distorting organizational priorities, and undermining productive 
grantor-grantee partnerships.281 Foundations have gone from hoping for 
results to partnering for results to demanding results, landing on an all-
too-common carrot-and-stick approach. In recent years, philanthropy has 
become a one-way relationship controlled more and more by funders.282 
If donors start taking anti-NGO concerns about authenticity and voice 
seriously, it might lead foundation trustees and managers to reconsider 
certain practices and policies, especially with respect to the current state 
of interactions between funder and grant-recipient NGOs. This is espe-
cially important in light of the cultural and social divide between North-
ern funders and Southern NGO grant recipients. Perhaps funders should 
begin by asking themselves how their behaviors undermine the grass-
roots voices and representativeness of NGOs. In particular, those North-
ern foundations exerting excessive control over grantees, directing activi-
ties, and turning Southern NGOs into subcontractors might reconsider 
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their approach if they understood that those activities contribute to at-
tacks on the global nonprofit sector. 
Concerns about national sovereignty283 and foreign influence in do-
mestic affairs284 will never be completely alleviated, but the perception—
and reality—of excessive outside donor influence only reinforces those 
particular fears in cross-border contexts. As donors engage in grantmak-
ing practices that “plac[e] themselves in the driver’s seat to control the 
agenda of nonprofit-sector projects,”285 they may diminish the voice of 
grant-recipient organizations and the local communities and peoples they 
serve. Furthermore, “[t]o the extent that [Northern funders] treat grantees 
as subcontractors and dominate”286 local-based NGOs, they create the 
appearance of the Global North speaking for the Global South in particu-
larly troubling ways that lack authenticity and transparency. As a result, 
donor control lends support to anti-NGO critiques about foreign influ-
ence and national sovereignty. Those same behaviors also may support 
charges of false representativeness, accusations of neocolonialism, and 
claims that international philanthropy supports elite donor interests (e.g., 
culture, values, policy formulation). 
Exposing the link between donor control and anti-NGO criticisms re-
veals an inverse relationship between the donor’s own accountability 
pressures and donee accountability. The roots of this new phenomenon 
lie in the desire of funders, especially private foundations importing 
business principles and standards into philanthropy, to demonstrate their 
own mission accountability. In fact, the desire for accountability and im-
pact has provided much of the stated justification for grantmakers to es-
chew general operating support grants in favor of inflexible, limited-
purpose program support287 and to restrict funding to foundation-initiated 
grantmaking initiatives.288 Thus, the prescriptive giving that has become 
the hallmark of the strategic philanthropy and philanthrocapitalism 
movements is intrinsically linked to the broader new “accountability en-
vironment” gripping the social sector.289 Efforts to enhance the accounta-
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bility of private foundations and other funders in the Global North may 
have the effect of weakening the accountability and legitimacy of South-
ern NGOs. Northern zeal for funder accountability (which has led to top-
down, prescriptive, controlling grantmaking) may directly undermine 
efforts of grant-recipient NGOs to generate their own accountability (i.e., 
downward) and legitimacy (both real and perceived). Although advice 
and expertise from the top can be welcome and beneficial, social trans-
formation requires the full participation of citizens and communities, 
with philanthropy providing supportive assistance rather than control. 
I am not naïve enough to believe that criticism of NGOs or govern-
ment action designed to curb NGOs would cease around the world if on-
ly donors were to loosen the reins of control. They will not. Moreover, 
philanthropy’s recent emphasis on exerting extensive donor control 
through directive grantmaking shows no signs of abating.290 Both anec-
dotal evidence291 and my own empirical research292 suggest that founda-
tion-centered and directive models of and practices in philanthropy are 
on the rise. Thus, it seems unlikely that foundations will begin to relin-
quish control in the short term. However, by giving serious consideration 
to the implications of the anti-NGO criticisms, perhaps more forward-
thinking foundations will come to understand that insistence on control-
ling the ways in which social problems are solved is deeply problematic. 
Besides undermining community-based bottom-up action and silencing 
important sources of social innovation,293 foundation efforts to mi-
cromanage social problem-solving may hurt grantee recipients. As foun-
dations prioritize their own efforts to prove their own mission accounta-
bility and effectiveness, it may come at the expense of their grantees. My 
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call is for funders to appreciate their opportunity to engage with grant-
recipient organizations, including foreign NGOs, in ways that strengthen 
NGOs and their international standing, instead of inadvertently handing 
the critics more ammunition. 
C. U.S.-Based International Programs vs. Overseas Recipients 
International philanthropy may be supported in a variety of different 
ways. Private foundations may choose to engage in international pro-
gramming either by making direct cross-border grants to foreign-based 
organizations or through indirect support delivered to U.S.-based entities 
with operations abroad. Some foundations, seeking fewer administrative 
requirements driven by U.S. law, choose the indirect route—providing 
“international” support through grants to U.S.-recognized or U.S.-based 
charities that conduct their activities outside the United States.294 
Anti-NGO concerns about authenticity and voice may encourage foun-
dation trustees and managers to reconsider some of the ways in which 
they implement international philanthropy. Specifically, they may recon-
sider whether to achieve their philanthropic objectives through direct 
support of foreign organizations or by channeling funding through U.S.-
based entities that may or may not work with local partner organizations. 
For U.S. private foundations, the burdens of law regulating nonprofit 
organizations and the pressures of the anti-terrorist financing regulatory 
environment have created disincentives for direct funding of foreign or-
ganizations.295 Under Internal Revenue Code section 4942, a private 
foundation is required to distribute a minimum percentage of the fair 
market value of non-charitable use assets in order to avoid certain federal 
excise taxes.296 This is often referred to as the 5% payout requirement. 
Foreign grants are considered “qualifying distributions” if they are made 
for charitable purposes and the grantor follows one of two detailed and 
rigorous procedural processes: equivalency determination or expenditure 
responsibility.297 In addition to federal tax requirements, criminal and 
civil penalties can be imposed if charitable contributions to foreign chari-
ties are used to support or engage in terrorism. Most notably, Executive 
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Order 13,324,298 the USA Patriot Act,299 and the U.S. Department of 
Treasury Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices 
for U.S.-Based Charities300 have contributed to the sense in the founda-
tion world that direct foreign giving carries greater administrative bur-
dens, cost, and risk. 
FIGURE 4. International Giving to U.S.-Based and Overseas Recipients 
as a Percentage of All Giving in Grant Dollars, 2006-2008301 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Foundation reliance on U.S. intermediary funders may be efficient for 
U.S. funders but it may have the unintended consequence of widening 
the distance between the professional cadre of NGOs in the field and the 
citizens those organizations serve. An analysis of major grantmaking 
expenditures revealed that between 2007 and 2008, support for interna-
tional giving increased 21.4%.302 The strong growth, however, principal-
ly benefited U.S.-based recipients with international programs (a 27% 
increase) in comparison with direct support to foreign charities, which 
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grew at less than half that rate (a 12.3% increase).303 FIGURE 4 shows 
that between 2006 and 2008, the most recent three years for which data 
are available, the share of overall grant dollars directed to international 
purposes increased from 22% to a record 24%. The share of grant dollars 
allocated to U.S.-based recipients increased by approximately one-third, 
from 12.1% to 16.1%. In contrast, the portion of grant dollars given di-
rectly to overseas charities declined by nearly one-sixth, from a record 
high of 9.9% down to 8.3%. 
Direct cross-border funding by private foundations and by the large in-
ternational NGOs that choose to partner with (via direct funding to) local 
organizations on the ground can help build the capacity of local, sustain-
able civil organizations abroad, generate social capital, and develop civil 
society.304 Political scientist Chip Gagnon has argued that international 
NGOs that encourage local actors and local NGOs to determine priorities 
and projects and that rely on local expertise are more effective. He 
writes: 
A review of [international NGO] work suggests that the most effective 
international NGOs are those that see their work as a two-way process, 
wherein the international agencies help local NGOs to determine their 
priorities, and personnel of the international agencies see locals as 
equal partners. The most effective strategies are those that integrate 
concrete projects and an inclusive decision-making process to build 
community and civil society locally, a strategy that allows local actors, 
communities, and NGOs to determine priorities, projects, and direc-
tions. This seems especially important for international NGOs that are 
seeking to strengthen local actors and networks as participants in civil 
society.305 
Direct overseas grantmaking that is relatively unencumbered can pro-
vide local NGOs with the support they need to grow.306 Through thought-
ful foreign funding strategies and approaches, perhaps matching funds 
that attract local monies, encouraging organizations to develop their own 
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local capacity, shifting mindset so that they are responsive to Southern 
NGOs, Northern funders can assist Southern NGOs in ways that do not 
jeopardize their autonomy and credibility.307 Funders can either choose to 
help create flourishing, self-sufficient non-Western NGOs less suscepti-
ble to many of the more stinging anti-NGO critiques or not. 
D. Focusing on the Practice of Philanthropy 
Foundations devote few resources and seem to pay little attention to 
the practice of philanthropy (i.e., the way foundation grantmaking is 
conducted and its effects). Rather, they tend to focus on the execution of 
their “core” substantive programs (i.e., their subject-matter priority 
fields). With few exceptions,308 most large foundations do not seem to 
think that supporting the development of the nonprofit sector should be a 
giving priority. This is unfortunate. Another potential lesson from the 
rise of the anti-NGO movement is the need to focus on the nonprofit sec-
tor infrastructure and to advocate for and defend the sector and its play-
ers from attacks. 
Individual organizations simply do not have the tools or the resources 
to respond to sector-wide critiques or to compete effectively against gov-
ernments. Although American public trust and support of the nonprofit 
sector remains high,309 a close examination of opinion data reveals some 
potential weaknesses310 causing concern among supporters of the sector. 
An earlier section of this Article discussed the organized, well-financed 
efforts underway to discredit nonprofit organizations through public 
campaigns.311 In Australia, for example, many of the right-wing criti-
cisms of nonprofits were shared by the conservative government of 
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Prime Minister John Howard,312 who served from 1996 to 2007.313 In 
addition, governments have used various strategies aimed at weakening 
NGOs.314 Many of these challenges and criticisms have targeted the non-
profit sector as a whole. Yet individual NGOs are usually focused on 
specific, substantive issues in their specialized area of focus. Therefore, 
they are less well-positioned to engage in public diplomacy campaigns at 
the macro level. 
FIGURE 5. Percentage of Grant Dollars Allocated to Philanthropy and 
Voluntarism by Year, 2004-2008315 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5 demonstrates that from 2004 to 2008 the largest U.S. funders 
have steadily reduced—as a percentage of overall giving—their grant-
making support for philanthropy and voluntarism.316 Of course there are 
many competing societal needs for charitable grant dollars, e.g., educa-
tion, health, the environment, etc. Moreover, this category may be too 
broad to draw precise conclusions about the nature of foundation support 
for the sector’s infrastructure. This five-year downward trend, however, 
suggests that the philanthropic sector should pay more attention to the 
resources it allocates to developing the health of the sector as a whole. 
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Such support might include resources to defend domestic nonprofits, in-
ternational organizations, and foreign NGOs from criticism; to educate 
and mobilize public opinion in support of NGOs; and to support re-
search, critical self-evaluation, and stakeholder conversations that might 
further strengthen the sector and civil society, even if it requires changes 
to current institutional arrangements, processes, and norms. 
CONCLUSION 
I support charitable giving, private foundations, and the global non-
profit sector as forces for positive change. The world needs strong non-
profit institutions, at all levels and all around the globe, for social trans-
formation and to provide organized groups through which aggregate in-
dividual voices, views, and interests can be represented.317 What I de-
scribe as the anti-NGO movement, a confluence of criticisms from the 
right and the left as well as government intrusions and strategies used to 
undermine the sector, exposes some of the sector’s vulnerabilities and 
challenges. These efforts to de-halo the nonprofit sector threaten the pub-
lic trust on which the nonprofit sector ultimately depends and are too 
important to ignore. 
Certainly, some critics conceive of the rise of NGO activity as a threat 
or a crisis. Although I do not share that view, some of the arguments 
raise legitimate questions worthy of critical examination. NGO funders 
should pay careful attention to such concerns and, more important, con-
sider how their own behavior may be contributing to the state of affairs. 
Ultimately, private philanthropy (as a form of private action) contributes 
to the public good by enhancing problem-solving capacity. But philan-
thropy does not operate in a vacuum. Private foundations are part of the 
civil society ecosystem. Thus NGO concerns are not just the responsibil-
ity or the fault of the NGOs themselves. Foundations and other nonprofit 
sector donors need to be mindful of how their actions support or under-
mine their grantees, the ultimate beneficiaries, and the charitable sector 
they inhabit. Lately, foundations have been involved in a self-reinvention 
project that has gone terribly awry, becoming divorced from the process-
es of successful social innovation.318 This Article concludes that these 
moves may be unintentionally weakening the standing of global NGOs 
and giving credence to anti-NGO critiques. 
What I take from the anti-NGO movement is not that we should ignore 
NGOs, nor that we should not engage in cross-border support. Instead 
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this Article concludes that true NGO accountability is about more than 
just responsiveness to funders. It is about being mindful of the fragility 
of NGO authenticity and voice, about Northern funders using their 
wealth and power to support—not control—social change, and about the 
need for the sector to improve public understanding of the “special quali-
ties that make nonprofit organizations worth protecting.”319 
Although the “NGO” acronym emphasizes an existence apart from 
government, civil society is valuable because it prioritizes collective ac-
tion, not because it is separate from government. Business is apart from 
government, but it does not contribute to civil society. However, if 
NGOs are merely subcontractors for Northern funders then they are not 
galvanizing citizens in a collaborative endeavor. The anti-NGO move-
ment raises deep and important questions of governance for foundations 
and international NGOs that fund foreign-based local NGOs. 
Perhaps foundation engagement with and against the anti-NGO 
movement can help facilitate new sensitivities, understanding, and prac-
tices leading to more autonomy and flexibility for civil society groups 
and the citizens working through them. Grantor-grantee relationships 
have always been complicated, and the politics of North-South NGO add 
new dimensions of complexity. As foundation assets and interest in in-
ternational philanthropy grow, the anti-NGO movement will grow as 
well, unless Northern funders address the problem and their own respon-
sibility for its creation. 
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